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Saving Small-Employer Health Insurance
Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz'
ABSTRACT: Health care reform devotes substantial attention to
resuscitatingthe small-group health insurance markets that serve employers
with fewer than fifty full-time employees. Nevertheless, a number of
interweaving provisions embedded within the Affordable Care Act create
strong incentives that, starting in 2014, will tend to undermine these
markets and, in the process, increase the fiscal cost of reform. First, small
employers with predominantly low-income employees will tend to opt out of
small-group markets. Second, small employers with mixed-income employees
will have strong incentives to offer coverage that is either technically not
"affordable" or that fails to provide "minimum value" in order to preserve
the availability of premium and cost-sharing subsidies on individual
markets for their low-income employees. Third, small employers with
unusually low-risk employees will have strong incentives to self-insure any
group plan they do offer in order to avoid cross-subsidizing higher-risk
groups. Analyzing these risks collectively, this Article offers a number of
recommendations for saving small-group markets. For instance, it argues
that the Small Employer ("SHOP") exchanges that are intended to organize
small-group markets in 2014 must strategically target the weaknesses of selfinsurance by offering simple and risk-free coverage options that facilitate
employee choice. They must also market this coverage aggressively in
response to insurance brokers' likely financial incentives to push selfinsurance on small employers. Additionally, state and federal regulators
should explore various possibilitiesfor making small employers more likely to
offer group coverage through SHOP exchanges. To accomplish this, they
should consider regulating stop-loss insurance and preventing churning
between the self-insured and small-group markets.

* Amy Monahan is a Professor and Solly Robbins Distinguished Research Fellow at the
University of Minnesota Law School and Daniel Schwarcz is an Associate Professor at the
University of Minnesota Law School. We are grateful to Mark Hall, Allison Hoffman, Timothy
Jost, and Bill Sage as well as to participants in workshops at Cornell Law School and UCLA Law
School for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. A condensed version of this
Article was published simultaneously as Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Limiting the ACA's
Threats to Small Group Health InsuranceMarkets, 16 RISK MGMT & INS. REV. 2 5 (2 013).
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INTRODUCTION

Private health insurance is sold in three distinct types of markets: largegroup, small-group, and individual.- Traditionally, large-group markets have
operated well, allowing virtually all large employers to offer reasonable
coverage to their employees.- By contrast, individual markets have proven
disastrous in most states, resulting in innumerable difficulties for people
seeking to purchase health insurance directly from insurers.3 Small-group
markets, which serve employers with fewer than fifty full-time employees,
have long been situated between these two polar extremes: they both suffer
some of the difficulties of individual markets and enjoy some of the
advantages of large-group markets.4
The Affordable Care Act ("ACA") was designed to build on this existing
system of private health insurance coverage.5 Rather than starting from
scratch, it sought to preserve the large-group market while dramatically
remaking the individual market.6 In response to the mixed track record of
small-group markets, the ACA adopted a correspondingly intermediate
approach to regulating these markets. On one hand, the ACA subjects smallgroup markets to many of the new insurance rules that it applies to
individual markets, including requiring the provision of "essential health
benefits," limiting permissible medical underwriting to age and smoking
status, and instituting minimum medical-loss ratios.7 It also requires the
establishment of Small Employer ("SHOP") exchanges to help organize
small-group markets, just as it does for individual markets.8 On the other
hand, though, the ACA preserves small employers' freedom not to offer
coverage, provides subsidies to support SHOP exchanges that are more
limited than those directed towards individual exchanges, and leaves smallemployers free to "self-insure" in order to avoid many of the regulatory
requirements that they would otherwise face.9

1.

See KENNETH

S. ABRAHAM

&

DANIEL

ScHwARcz,

HEALTHCARE

SUPPLEMENT

TO

ABRAHAM'S INSURANCE LAw AND REGULATION 3-4 ( 5 th ed. 201 o).
2.
See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2
YALEJ. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 23, 30-31 (2001 ).
3.
See Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by
Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 135-36 (201 1).

4. See Mark A. Hall, The Competitive Impact of Small Group Health Insurance Reform Laws, 32
U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 685, 691-92 (1999).
5.

See infra Part I.

6.

See Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 136-53.

7.

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, §

1oo,

124 Stat. 119, 130-38 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); ACA §
1201,42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1 to 300gg-7 (2006 & Supp. V 2ol); ACA § 1302, 4 2 U.S.C. § 18022
(Supp. V 201 1).

8. ACA§ 1311(b)(1)(B),4 2U.S.C.§ 18o 3 1(b)(i)(B).
See infra Part 1.

9.
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This Article argues that this mixed approach to regulating small-group
markets will subject them to substantial instability beginning in 2014, when
many of the ACA's most important reforms come into effect. First, the ACA's
reforms are likely to encourage many small employers with predominantly
low-income employees to opt out of small-group markets, despite smallbusiness tax credits that were explicitly designed to incentivize these firms to
both offer and subsidize group coverage.1 ° This is a result of the ACA's
intertwined regulation of individual and small-group markets, which will
actually make low-income employees of small employers worse off if they are
offered "affordable" employer coverage that provides "minimum value." By
virtue of being offered such coverage, low-income employees will become
ineligible for very substantial premium and cost-sharing subsidies on the
individual market that dwarf the tax benefits they would receive from
employer-sponsored coverage.- This incentive for certain small employers
to avoid offering coverage to low-income employees is unprecedented and is
a largely unappreciated consequence of the ACA. Yet it will increase the
fiscal cost of the ACA while decreasing the stability of small-group markets.
Second, the ACA is likely to cause many small employers with mixedincome employees to pursue strategies that simultaneously preserve
premium and cost-sharing subsidies on the individual market for their lowincome employees, while allowing their high-income employees to continue
to enjoy the significant tax subsidy provided by purchasing group coverage
with pre-tax dollars.- To accomplish this, a small employer can offer group
coverage, but structure that coverage so that it either is not "affordable" for
low-income employees or does not provide "minimum value." Under either
approach, low-income employees would remain eligible for large public
subsidies for coverage in the individual market, but high-income employees
would nonetheless be able to acquire group coverage and thereby take
advantage of the associated tax benefits. Crucially, group coverage that is
"unaffordable" for low-income employees or does not provide "minimum
value" would not necessarily be unattractive to high-income employees. An
employer has many options for structuring its group plan in ways that
technically meet one of these conditions, but that would, as a practical
matter, provide affordable, desirable health insurance coverage for highincome employees.'s This strategic behavior would once again increase the
ACA's fiscal consequences and undermine the stability of small-group
markets.

io.

See infra Part II.A.

1i.

See infra Part II.A.

12.

See infra Part II.C.

13.

See infra Part HI.B.
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Third, the ACA is certain to make "self-insuring" the cost of their
employees' health care costs more attractive for small employers.14 By doing
so, small employers will escape numerous requirements embedded within
the ACA.l5 This will be particularly valuable for small employers who view
their employees to be less risky than similarly aged small-employer groups.
Self-insuring effectively allows these employers to escape the ACA's
prohibition against premium discounts for healthier groups.' 6 In addition,
while self-insuring typically involves the retention of a large amount of risk
on the part of employers, stop-loss insurance, which provides employers with
coverage if certain medical expenses in a self-insured plan exceed a specified
threshold, is becoming more readily available to small employers.7 The
heightened availability of stop-loss coverage has increased the likelihood
that many small employers that offer group coverage post-2014 will elect to

offer self-insured plans. If self-insurance becomes widespread among small
employers, small-group markets could face substantial adverse selection: as
comparatively healthy small groups exit the market, premiums must increase
to reflect the decreasing health of the remaining small groups, which may
further cause low-risk small groups to exit the market.'8 Crucially, the
likelihood of adverse selection and the potential for it to result in a "death
spiral" is directly related to the overall size of the small-group market, and
thus to the first two sources of small-employer opt-out described above.,9
These sources of instability pose substantial and under-appreciated
obstacles to the future of small-group markets. This Article, however, argues
that these obstacles are not insurmountable. State and federal lawmakers
have numerous opportunities to mitigate these risks and preserve a vital
segment of the private health insurance market. One of these opportunities
has been described extensively elsewhere: states can, and should, regulate
the provision of stop-loss insurance, which makes self-insurance a realistic
option for most small employers by insulating them from genuine risk

14.

Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or "One Good Loophole Deserves
105-o6 (2005).

Another,"5 YALEJ. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 89,
15.
16.

See infra Part III.
See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Mark A. Hall, Self Insurancefor Small Employers Under the

Affordable Care Act: Federal and State Regulatory Options 9-1o (Wash. & Lee Pub. Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Accepted Paper No. 2012-24, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2o7o883.
17.
See id. at 5-6.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See Ronen Avraham, Kyle D. Logue & Daniel Schwarcz, UnderstandingInsurance AntiDiscriminationLaws (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 120 17, 2013) (forthcoming, Southern California Law Review, 2013), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=21358oo.
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associated with their employees' medical expenses.2 0 Standing alone,
however, this reform is unlikely to save most states' small-group markets.
Rather than focusing solely on stop-loss regulation, this Article explores
a number of complementary approaches to defusing the risks to small-group
markets described above.-- It emphasizes that states must focus not just on
increasing the risks to small employers of self-insuring, but also on designing
coverage on SHOP exchanges to affirmatively attract small employers who
may be considering either self-insuring or dropping coverage completely. In
particular, states should design small-group coverage as a simple and riskfree option that facilitates employee choice, thus contrasting it with selfinsurance, which is complicated, potentially risky, and eliminates employee
choice.22 SHOP exchanges must then market this message aggressively and
limit the capacity of self-insurance to outcompete SHOP coverage by paying
brokers higher commissions. Finally, states must take measures to limit
churning between SHOP exchanges and self-insurance that would allow
small employers to exploit changes in their risk status. They could
accomplish this by either limiting enrollment periods for previously selfinsured employers or charging such employers larger fees to join the
exchange.
Ultimately, then, this Article argues that the risk that small-group
markets will collapse after 2014 is significant, but can be substantially
mitigated by a range of complementary regulatory interventions. Of course,
a skeptic may reasonably wonder whether small-group insurance markets
ought to be saved. If the insurance exchanges established by the ACA reform
individual markets as intended, then they may provide a reasonable, and
perhaps superior, alternative to small-group markets. Given that the ACA is
in fact structured around functioning small-group markets,'23 however, this
Article proceeds on the assumption that the ACA will not be able to
accomplish its broader goals as effectively if that market segment collapses.
Politically, the ACA will face dramatic new challenges if its numerous efforts
to preserve small-group markets fail. And more practically, small-group
markets provide tax benefits and preexisting infrastructure that can support
the preservation and expansion of coverage, while much uncertainty
remains regarding the stability and robustness of individual insurance
exchanges.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by providing background
on the ACA's reform of small-group markets. Part II then describes the risks

See Mark A. Hall, Regulating Stop-Loss Coverage May Be Needed to Deter Self-Insuring Small
(2o12); Jost & Hall, supra
note 16, at 13-15.
20.

Employers From Undermining Market Reforms, 31 HEALTH AFF. 316, 316
21.

22.
23.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infta Part 1.
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to small-group marketplaces stemming from small employers' incentives to
offer coverage. Part II shows why small employers with low-income
employees will tend to opt out of small-group markets and how small
employers with mixed-income employees can exploit the ACA's rules to
maximize public subsidies for their employees. Part III then explores the
threats to small-group markets related to self-insurance and shows how they
interact with the risks described in Part II to further decrease the stability of
small-group markets and SHOP exchanges. Finally, Part IV explores various
potential responses to these threats, including the regulation of stop-loss
coverage and numerous complementary strategies.
I.

THE ACA's REFORM OF SMALL-GROUP MARKETS

A.

SMALL-GROUP MARKES PRE-ACA

Employer-provided health insurance has been a key component of
health insurance access in the United States for many decades.4 In 2010,
just over 6o% of the non-elderly population obtained health insurance
coverage through an employer plan.25 However, employees' access to such
coverage differs dramatically according to the size of their employer.
Historically, large employers have been much more likely than their smaller
counterparts to offer health care coverage. In 201 1, one large survey found
that only 48% of firms with three to nine workers offered employee health
coverage, while 99% of firms with more than 200 workers did so.26
The relative reluctance of small employers to offer coverage is
attributable to at least three factors. First, the administrative costs associated
with small-employer coverage are much greater on a per capita basis than
they are for larger firms. Indeed, administrative expenses account for 2527% of premiums in small-group markets, but only 5-1o% in large-group
markets.27 Second, smaller firms do not often have the in-house expertise

24.

25.

See Hyman & Hall, supra note 2, at 25-26.
JOHN HOLAHAN & VICKI CHEN, THE HENRY

J.

KAISER FAMILY FOUND., CHANGES IN

at 6 fig.6 (2011 ), available
at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/826 4 .pdf (reporting that 6o.4% of non-elderly
Americans were covered under an employer plan in 201o, down from 7o.6% in 2000).
26. GARY CLAXTON ET AL., THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH &
EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 201 ANNUAL SURVEY 36 exhibit 2.2 (201 1),
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE GREAT RECESSION, 2007-2010,

availableat http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2o1 i/8225.pdf.
27.
Cathy Schoen et al., Building Blocks for Reform: Achieving Universal Coverage with Private
and Public Group Health Insurance, 27 HEALTH AFF. 646, 647 (2oo8). The Affordable Care Act's
medical-loss ratio requirements, which became effective in 201 1, may have already begun to
lower administrative expenses in small-group markets. For an overview of 2011 data, see The
80/2o Rule: Providing Value and Rebates to Millions of Consumers, HEALTHCARE.GOV (June 21,
2012), http://www.healthcare.gov/news/reports/mlr-rebateso62 120 12a.html.
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necessary to navigate the complex decision-making process associated with
choosing a quality health plan.28
Third, and most importantly, the poor health status of just one or two
employees can disproportionately affect the cost and availability of smallemployer coverage. Large employers can be insured at community-average
rates because the law of large numbers tends to ensure that their employees'
overall health care expenses are similar to those of the broader
community.29 Small groups do not have this same feature. Their employees'
aggregate health care costs can be dramatically impacted by a single
employee's high-cost medical condition. Furthermore, federal law prevents
an employer from discriminating on the basis of health status with respect to
a group plan's eligibility, premiums, or services.so A small employer is
unable, therefore, to exclude high-risk employees from coverage, or charge
the employee a higher premium for coverage. Because small-group policies
are typically purchased on a yearly basis, small employers often face
significant premium increases following years in which an employee
becomes considered high-risk.3' The extreme premium volatility that
medical underwriting in small groups causes is thought to lead many small
employers to decline to offer coverage in the first place or to drop coverage
2
as premiums rise.3
These barriers to broad coverage in small-group markets have proven
resistant to a variety of reform efforts. Throughout the i 99os, various states
required insurers to issue coverage to any small group that applied and
restricted the reasons that an insurer could decline to renew coverage.33
Many states also implemented rating restrictions that limited the extent to
which small-group premiums could vary based on the health risks of the
employee group.34 Despite these efforts, small-group offer rates remain quite
low and have been falling in recent years.35 At the same time, small

28. See David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States-Origins
and Implications, 355 NEw ENG.J. MED. 82, 87 (2oo6).
29. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 2, at 32.
30. 29U.S.C.§ 1182 (2oo6&Supp. V2oll).
See PAUL FRONSTIN ET AL., EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., SMALL EMPLOYERS AND
31.
HEALTH BENEFITS: FINDINGS FROM THE 2002 SMALL EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY 4

(2003), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/o'o3ib.pdf (noting that 28% of small

employers surveyed experienced an annual increase in premiums of at least
32.

20%).

See, e.g., Roger Feldman et al., The Effect of Premiums on the Small Firm'sDecision to Offer

Health Insurance, 32J. HUM. RESOURCES 635, 654-56 (1997).
33. Hall, supra note 4, at 691-92.
34. Id. at 693-94.
35. CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 26, at 36 exhibit 2.2 (finding the offer rates for the
smallest employers fell from 59% in 2010 to 48% in 201 1).
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employers continue to face much greater health insurance costs than their
larger counterparts.36
Health reformers have nonetheless remained interested in increasing
small-group offer rates, for at least two reasons. First, the individual market
for health insurance in most states has historically been even less attractive
than the small-group market, particularly for individuals with negative
health history or risks. Although individual health insurance markets vary
significantly by state, most suffer from significant adverse selection, meaning
that the population that buys coverage has a higher risk level than the
population as a whole.s7 Such adverse selection not only increases
premiums, it also leads insurers to engage in various risk-management
techniques that limit coverage or increase costs for individuals with poor
health histories.3S These techniques, which include excluding coverage for
pre-existing
conditions
and
rescinding
coverage
for innocent
misrepresentations when an individual becomes high risk, also ultimately
harm healthy individuals who find coverage unavailable once it is needed.9
Group insurance coverage is thought to suffer from less adverse selection
than the individual market.4o
Another reason that reform efforts have focused on increasing smallemployer offer rates is that there are tax benefits that are available
exclusively to employer-provided coverage, which increase small-group
coverage affordability compared to individual coverage. Employer-sponsored
health insurance can be paid entirely with pre-tax income, whereas coverage
an employee purchases on the individual market must be paid for with aftertax dollars.4, This tax benefit not only makes employer-provided coverage
more affordable for all employees,42 but it also encourages employers to
contribute to coverage and low-risk employees to opt for coverage they
might otherwise find too expensive given their risk level.43

36.

SeeJon Gabel et al., Generosity and Adjusted Premiums in Job-Based Insurance: HawaiiIs Up,

Wyoming Is Down, 25 HEALTH AFF. 832, 835 (2oo6).

37. See, e.g., Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et al., The Role of the Individual Health Insurance
Market and ProspectsforChange, 23 HEALTH AFF. 79, 81-82 (2004).
38. See id.
39. SeeABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supranote I, at 3.
40.
See, e.g., Hall, supra note 4, at 689, 692-93.
41. See I.R.C. §§ 1o6, 125 (2oo6 & Supp. V 2011) (providing that both employer and
employee contributions towards employer-provided health insurance coverage can be excluded
from an employee's income). No similar provision exists for individual coverage purchased
directly by an employee. Self-employed individuals may, however, deduct health insurance
premiums paid from their taxable income. See id. § 162 (1).
42. See Mark A. Hall & Amy B. Monahan, PayingforIndividualHealth Insurance Through TaxSheltered Cafeteria Plans,47 INQUIRY 252, 252 (2010).

43. For a more detailed discussion of the impact of the tax benefit for employer-provided
coverage on risk pooling, see generally Amy B. Monahan, The Complex Relationship Between Taxes
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B. THE REGULATION OFINDIV1DUAL AND SMALL-GROUP MARKETS POST-A CA
The potential strengths of small-group markets coupled with their
historical shortcomings made them a core target of the ACA.44 Because of
the interconnections between small-group and individual markets,
understanding the ACA's potential effects on the former requires
considering its regulation of the latter.
i.

The ACA's Regulation of Individual and Small-Group Markets

Many of the ACA's small-group market reforms also apply to individualinsurance markets. Starting in 2014, the pricing, offering, and renewal of
policies in both markets will be strictly regulated. Health insurers will be
required to offer coverage to every applicant,45 forbidden from excluding
any pre-existing conditions,46 and allowed to cancel or decline to renew
coverage in very limited circumstances.47 In both markets, insurers will be
permitted to vary price based only on four factors: age, geographic location,
tobacco use, and family size.48 The extent to which premiums can vary based
on tobacco use will be constrained to a 1.5 to I ratio, and age-based
premium variation will be similarly limited to a 3 to I ratio.49 Importantly,
these rules limit insurer pricing of small-group policies, but they do not
apply to the individuals who comprise the small group.5o Preexisting federal
law requires that employees be charged premiums for group coverage that
do not vary based on health status.5'
The ACA also substantially regulates the content of health insurance
policies in individual and small-group markets beginning in 2014. It
requires plans in these markets to cover benefits that the Secretary of Health

and Health Insurance (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No.
1 o-o 1, 2o o), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 531322.
44.

See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, HEALTH REFORM FOR SMALL BUSINESS: THE AFFORDABLE
available at
http://whitehouse.gov/files/documents/health-reform-for_small businesses.pdf; COUNCIL OF
ECON. ADVISERS, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF HEALTH CARE
REFORM ON SMALL BUSINESSES AND THEIR EMPLOYEES (2oo9), available at http://www.
CARE ACT INCREASES CHOICE AND SAVING MONEY FOR SMALL BUSINESSES (2010),

whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/CEA-smallbusiness-july2
45.

4

.pdf.

ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148,§ 1201, 124Stat. 119, 154 (2010) (codified as amended at

42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2oo6 & Supp. V 2o s)) (adding § 2702 to the Public Health Service Act
("PHSA")).

46.
47.
48.

ACA § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 3oogg (adding § 2704(a) to the PHSA).
ACA § 1201,42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-2,-12 (adding §§ 2703, 2712 to the PHSA).
ACA § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 3oogg (adding § 2701 to the PHSA).

49.

Id.

50.

See id.

51.

29U.S.C.§ 1182(b) (2oo6&Supp. V2oll).
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& Human Services ("HHS") defines as "essential health benefits."52 It also
limits cost-sharing in various ways. Plans are prohibited from utilizing
lifetime or annual benefit limits with respect to any essential health
benefits.53 In addition, individual and small-group plans are required to
limit the overall cost-sharing a plan imposes54 to the cap applicable to highdeductible health plans offered in conjunction with a health savings
account.55 In 2012, the out-of-pocket limit on such plans was $6050 for
individual coverage and $12,100 for family coverage.56 Notably, the ACA
imposes an additional cost-sharing restriction that applies to small employer
plans, but not plans purchased in individual markets: small-group plans may
not have deductibles that exceed $2000 for individual coverage or $4000 for
family coverage.57
Plans in individual and small-group markets are also subject to several
rules designed to ensure both that a sufficient amount of premiums are
spent on medical care and that firms do not compete by trying to cherry
pick healthier-than-average enrollees. In both individual and small-group
markets, plans must spend 8o% of premium dollars on medical losses,
leaving a maximum of 20% for administrative expenses and profits.58 Any
amounts spent in excess of that 20% must be refunded to policyholders.59
The ACA also establishes a risk-adjustment mechanism that applies to both
individual and insured group plans. 6o This program extends indefinitely and
charges low actuarial-risk plans a penalty while providing payments to high
actuarial-risk plans in order to discourage insurers from competing for low6
risk enrollees. '

52.
ACA § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 3oogg-6 (2oo6 & Supp. V 2011) (adding § 2707 to the
PHSA); ACA § 1301, 42 U.S.C. § 18021 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); ACA § 1302, 42 U.S.C. §
18022.

53. ACA § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 (2oo6 & Supp. V 2011) (adding § 2711 to the
PHSA).
54. Such cost-sharing is often referred to as an out-of-pocket maximum.
55. ACA§ 13 02(c) (1), 4 2U.S.C. § 18o22(c)(1) (2oo6&Supp. V2011).
56.

Rev. Proc. 2011-32, 2011-22 I.R.B. 835.

57. ACA§ 13 02(c)(2)(A), 4 2 U.S.C.§ 18o22(c)(2)(A).
58. ACA § 1001, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A) (2oo6 & Supp. V 2o11). These
requirements are labeled "medical-loss ratio" requirements, or MLR rules. Large-group plans
are subject to a higher medical-loss ratio of 85%. ACA § 1331, 42 U.S.C. § 18o51 (Supp. V
2011).

59. ACA § 1001,42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b) (1)(A)(2oo6 & Supp. V 2o 1).
6o. ACA § 1343, 42 U.S.C. § 18o63 (Supp. V 2011). The ACA also establishes two
temporary reinsurance programs designed to protect insurers against high-risk enrollees. See
ACA § 1341,42 U.S.C. § 186oi; ACA § 1342,42 U.S.C. § 18602.

61. ACA § 1343, 42 U.S.C. § 18o63. There is also a temporary three-year program that
establishes "risk corridors" to protect insurers against the risk of uncertain rate-setting in the
first few years of exchange operation. See Mark A. Hall, The Three Types of Reinsurance Created by
FederalHealth Refo rm, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1168, 1170-71 (2010).
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For both the individual and small-group markets, the ACA will create
insurance exchanges in each state with the goal of simplifying and
streamlining insurance-purchasing decisions. States will have the option of
keeping the individual and small-group markets separate or merging them
into a single market. 62 Regardless, plans offered on an exchange must be
"qualified health plans" that meet the requirements described above and
provide actuarial value within a range of 6o% to 90%.63 In order to help
consumers compare insurance options, plans will be classified by actuarial
values that are labeled bronze (the lowest actuarial value plans, at 6o%),
silver (70% actuarial value), gold (8o% actuarial value), or platinum (9o%
actuarial value). 64 While insurers are permitted to offer plans outside of the
exchange, both individual and small-group plans offered outside of the
exchange must still comply with all of the regulations described in this
Subpart. 65 As explored more fully in Part III, small employers may
circumvent many of the ACA's provisions by electing to self-insure their
health plans.
The ACA's Subsidies and Taxes in Individual and Small-Group Markets

2.

The ACA contains a complex mix of incentives and penalties with
respect to both an employer's decision to offer coverage and an individual's
decision to elect coverage. The ACA's most well-known provision, the
"individual mandate," imposes a financial penalty on individuals who have
affordable coverage available to them and decline to acquire it.66 Coverage is
considered affordable if premiums are less than or equal to 8% of the
individual's household income. 67 The penalty for failing to purchase such
coverage is equal to the greater of (1) $695 per person in a household, up
to a maximum of $2085, or (2) 2.5% of household income.6 8 Public
coverage, individually purchased coverage, and employer coverage can all
6
exempt individuals from this penalty. 9
In order to increase the number of individuals who have access to
affordable coverage, the ACA provides substantial subsidies in the form of
tax credits for the purchase of individual health insurance coverage through

62.

ACA

§

1311(b) (2),

42

U.S.C. § 18o31(b) (2); ACA

§

1312(c)(3),

42

U.S.C. §

18o32(c) (3).
63.
64.

65.

ACA
ACA

§
§

1302, 42 U.S.C. § 18022.
1 3 02(d), 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d).
ACA § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 3oogg- 6 (2oo6 & Supp. V 2011) (adding § 2707 to the

PHSA).
66. ACA § 15 01 (b), I.R.C. § 5 oooA (Supp. V 2o1 1).
67. ACA § 15 01(b), I.R.C. § 5 oooA(e)(i).
68. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), Pub. L. No. i ii152, § 1002, 12 Stat. 1029, 1032 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 5 oooA(c)) (amending the

ACA).
69.

ACA§ 15 o(b),I.R.C.§5oooA(f).
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an exchange.7o The credits are available to individuals with household
income between ioo% and 400% of the federal poverty limit ("FPL") and
are calculated on a sliding scale that specifies the percentage of income an
individual will be required to pay for coverage.7' The credit is equal to the
difference between the amount the individual is required to pay and the
actual cost of the second-lowest-cost silver-level plan available to her based
on age and geographic area.7, The ACA also provides reductions in costsharing for individuals with household income between ioo% and 400%
FPL who elect silver-level coverage on an exchange.73
Individuals who are offered employer coverage that is affordable and
provides "minimum value" are not eligible for these tax credits or costsharing subsidies.74 Employer coverage is considered affordable if the
employee's share of premiums does not exceed 9.5% of the employee's
household income.75 For example, if an employee earns $22,340 per year
(currently 200% of the federal poverty level), but is eligible for employerprovided coverage, she could receive a premium tax credit only if the
required contribution for her employer coverage exceeds $2122 per year
(9-5% of her income). A plan fails to provide minimum value if "the plan's
share of the total allowed costs of benefits provided under the plan is less
6
than 6o percent of such costs."7

Although the ACA imposes potential financial penalties on employers
that fail to provide health care coverage to employees,77 small employers
with fewer than fifty full-time employees are not subject to these penalties.7 8
Instead, the ACA provides some small employers with a limited incentive to

70.

ACA § 1401 (a), I.R.C. § 3 6B.
ACA § 1401 (a), I.R.C. § 3 6B(b).
72. To illustrate, assume that a single individual has household income exactly equal to
2oo% FPL. That individual would be entitled to a tax credit equal to the difference between the
premium for silver-level coverage available to her and 6.3% of her household income, thereby
ensuring that the individual only has to pay 6.3% of household income in order to purchase
silver-level coverage. The credit is not, however, limited to silver-level coverage. The individual
can take the credit and use it to purchase coverage of any level with the exchange. If the
individual chooses to purchase coverage that is either more or less generous than the silver-level
coverage on which the credit is calculated, her share of premiums would be either lower or
higher than the 6.3% assumed.
73. ACA§ 14 o2, 4 2 U.S.C.§ 18071 (Supp. V2ol1).
74. ACA § 1401(a), I.R.C. § 3 6B(c) (2) (C) (Supp. V 201).
75. ACA§ 14 o(a),I.R.C. § 3 6B(c)(2)(C)(i)(II).
76. ACA § 1401(a), I.R.C. § 3 6B(c)(2) (C)(ii).
77. Effective in 2014, the ACA imposes a monetary penalty on employers with more than
fifty full-time employees who either do not offer health insurance coverage or do offer coverage
but have at least one employee who receives a tax credit or cost-sharing reduction. ACA § 1513,
I.R.C. § 4 98oH. Employers that do not offer coverage and have at least one full-time employee
who receives a premium tax credit face an annual fee of $2000 per full-time employee,
excluding the first thirty employees from the assessment. ACA § 1513, I.R.C. § 498oH(c) (1).
78. ACA§ 1513, I.R.C. §498oH(c)(2).
71.
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voluntarily offer coverage. Beginning in 201o, employers with fewer than
twenty-five full-time equivalent employees and average wages of less than
$50,000 were potentially eligible for a tax credit.79 In order to qualify, the
employer must provide health insurance to employees and pay at least 50%
of the cost of such coverage.so Initially, the maximum credit available was
35% of the employer-paid portion of the premiums. s ' Beginning in 2014,
the maximum credit amount will increase to 50% of the employer-paid
premiums but will only be available for two consecutive years.8 2 The net
result is that the maximum duration of this credit is six years (four years
from 2010 through 2013, and two years beginning in 2014 or thereafter).
In addition to this temporary subsidy, the ACA allows small employers
to provide exchange-based coverage as a cafeteria plan benefit.8s Cafeteria
plans allow employees to pay for certain qualified benefits with pre-tax
dollars.8 4 Even if an employer does not make any contribution to an
employee's health insurance, such plans can save employees substantial
sums by allowing them to pay for insurance using pre-tax dollars. Prior to
the ACA, there was uncertainty regarding whether such cafeteria plans could
be used to pay for individual, rather than group, health insurance.S5 The
ACA resolves this uncertainty by providing that cafeteria plans can only be
used to pay for exchange-based health insurance coverage if a small
employer offers its employees "the opportunity to enroll through such an
Exchange in a qualified health plan in a group market."8 6 While regulations
have yet to be issued providing the precise contours of this provision, the
implication is that a small employer eligible to participate in an exchange
could designate one or more group plans offered on the exchange to
employees, and those employees could pay their share of the premiums for
such coverage on a pre-tax basis through the employer's cafeteria plan. In
no event, however, could a cafeteria plan be used to pay for individual
coverage purchased through an exchange.7

79. ACA§ 1421,I.R.C.§ 4 5 R(d).
8o. In order to receive the maximum credit, the employer must have ten or fewer full-time
equivalent employees that are paid average annual compensation of $25,ooo or less per fulltime employee. ACA § 1421, I.R.C. § 4 5 R(c)-(d) (Supp. V 201 1).
81. ACA§ 1 4 21,I.R.C.§ 4 5 R(g).
82.
Id.
83. ACA § 1515(a), I.R.C. § 12 5 (f)(3 ).
84. In recent years, there has been interest at the state level in requiring employers to
offer their employees the ability to purchase individual health insurance through a cafeteria
plan. See generally Mark A. Hall et al., Using PayrollDeduction to Shelter IndividualHealth Insurance
from Income Tax, 4 6 HEALTH SERvIcES RES. 348 (2o 11).
85. Hall & Monahan, supra note 42, at 257-59.
86. ACA § 1515(a), I.R.C. § 125 (f)( 3 ) (emphasis added). Beginning in 2014, if a state
elects to allow large groups to participate in the exchange, those large employers would also
have the ability to use a cafeteria plan to pay for exchange-based coverage. Id.
87. See id.
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Finally, all employers, regardless of size, are potentially subject to an
excise tax on high-cost plans starting in 20 18. This so-called "Cadillac Tax" is
equal to 40% of the amount by which an employer's group health plan
premium exceeds certain dollar thresholds.88 In analyzing whether the
dollar-amount threshold is met, the costs of all applicable group health
plans of an employer are aggregated.89 The excise tax generally applies to
the extent that the annual cost of such plans exceeds $10,200 for self-only
coverage or $27,500 for any other form of coverage.90
The ACA's various individual and employer penalties and incentives are
difficult to parse because they are both varied and intertwined. Part II below
will explore how the ACA's regulations and incentives are likely to affect a
small employer's decision to offer its employees health insurance coverage.
II.

SMALL EMPLOYERS AND THE DECISION TO OFFER GROUP COVERAGE POST-

ACA
The rate at which employers offer their employees some form of health
insurance is often broken down by employer size. In 2o 1, for instance,
health insurance was offered by 48% of employers with between 3 and 9
employees, 71% of employers with between io and 24 employees, 85% of
employers with between 25 and 49 employees, and 93% of employers with
between 5o and 199 workers.91 Among employers with over 2oo employees,
99% offered their employees health insurance.92 The correlation between
employer size and the propensity to offer group health coverage is both
strong and persistent over time.93
This Part argues that beginning in 2014, the propensity of small
employers to offer group health coverage will correlate less with size than
with the income profile of their employees. It argues that due to tax credit
eligibility provisions, small employers with predominantly low-income
employees will face strong incentives to drop coverage completely starting in
2014. By contrast, it shows that small employers with predominantly high-

88. I.R.C. § 4 98oi(a). The term "group health plan" includes not only standard medical
plans, but also health reimbursement arrangements, health flexible spending accounts offered
through a cafeteria plan, and health savings accounts. See id. § 4 98oi(f)(4) (citing I.R.C. §
5 000(b) (i)). Notably, it excludes stand-alone dental and vision plans from its reach. Standalone dental and vision plans are also included in the definition of group health plan under §
5 000(b) (1) but are specifically exempted from the excise-tax provisions. See id.
89. Id. § 4 9 8oi(b)(2)(A).
go. Id. § 4 98oi(b) (3) (C) (i). Multiemployer plans get a special break that provides that all
multiemployer plan coverage shall be considered to be "coverage other than self-only
coverage." Id. § 4 98oI(b)( 3 )(B)(ii). A multiemployer plan is a plan that more than one
employer contributes to pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. See id. § 4 14 (f)(1)
(2oo6 & Supp. V 201 1).
91.

CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 26, at 36 exhibit 2.2.

92.

Id.

93.

See id.

2013]

SAVING SMALL-EMPLOYER HEALTH INSURANCE

1951

income workers will have strong incentives to offer some form of group
coverage. Finally, it shows that small employers whose employees vary
significantly in their income levels will face more complicated incentives, but
are likely to favor offering coverage. However, they are likely to design that
coverage so that it is either not "affordable" with respect to low-income
employees or does not provide "minimum value."
A.

SMALL EMPLOYERS WITH PREDOMINANTLY LOW-INCOME EMPLOYEES

Starting in 2014, small employers whose employees are predominantly
low income will generally opt not to offer any form of employer-sponsored
coverage. There are four contributing elements to this prediction. The first,
and most important, is that employers of predominantly low-income
employees will generally make their employees worse off by offering
coverage. This is because individuals who are offered employer coverage
that is "affordable" and provides "minimum value" are not eligible for either
premium tax credits or cost-sharing subsidies on the individual insurance
exchanges.94 This effect is unprecedented: never before could an employer's
decision to offer health insurance coverage potentially make its employees
worse off. Yet, this effect has received remarkably little attention in the
academic literature.95

Although the amount that low-income employees of small employers
would forfeit in public subsidies as a result of being offered coverage
depends on numerous factors, it is certain to be quite large. For instance,
assuming an annual premium of $4780 for silver-level coverage in 2014, an
employee making 200% of the federal poverty limit ("FPL"), or about
$22,000, would lose an estimated $3394 in health insurance premium

subsidies.96 Because this credit is based on the maximum percentage of
income that an eligible individual will be required to pay for silver-level
coverage, if premiums are higher than currently anticipated, the forfeited

94. I.R.C.§ 3 6B(c)(2)(C) (Supp.V2011).
95. There are, of course, notable exceptions. See generally David Gamage, Pervasive Incentives
Arisingfrom the Tax Provisions of HealthcareReform: Why FurtherReforms Are Needed to Prevent Avoidable
Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REv. 669, 7Ol-O8 (2012) (noting that the ACA
will discourage low- and moderate-income employees from accepting jobs that provide affordable
health insurance). The Congressional Budget Office has in its projections acknowledged that
small firms, particularly with low-income workers, would drop coverage as a result of the ACA, but
it does not make clear the basis for its projections (for example, whether their prediction is driven
by the incentives described here, or whether it is based on low demand from low-wage workers).
See Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Harry Reid, Majority Leader,
U.S. Senate 9 (Dec. 19, 2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
ftpdocs/1 o8xx/doc i o868/12-19g-reidjlettermanagerscorrection.noted.pdf.
96. The individual would then be entitled to a tax credit equal to the difference between
$478o (the silver-plan premium) and $1386 (6.3% of household income), which equals $3394.
SeeACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1401(a), 124 Stat. 119, 213 (2010) (codified as amended at
I.R.C § 3 6B).
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subsidy from being offered employer-sponsored coverage will be even
larger.97 Importantly, while the credit is calculated on the basis of the
second-lowest-cost silver plan, the employee would be free to choose any
plan offered within the exchange.98 Thus, if the individual chose a bronzelevel plan with an annual premium of only $4100, she would still receive the
$3394 tax credit and would only be required to pay $7o6 out of pocket for
such coverage.
In addition to losing valuable premium tax credits, the same lowincome employees would lose valuable cost-sharing subsidies as a result of
being offered employer-sponsored coverage. Under the ACA, individuals
eligible for premium tax credits who elect silver-level coverage will receive
cost-sharing reductions. An individual who earns 2oo% FPL, for example,
would be eligible to have her out-of-pocket maximum reduced by two-thirds
and the percentage of expenses that a plan pays increased to 87%.99
Assuming that the out-of-pocket maximum in 2014 will be $6350," '° the
individual in this example would have her out-of-pocket maximum reduced
to approximately $2115, significantly limiting that individual's risk
exposure. Similarly, the individual's co-insurance amounts would be
reduced if she were to incur medical expenses above the deductible.-o° By
offering this employee coverage, an employer would eliminate the
employee's eligibility for these benefits as well.
Although an employer that declined to offer group coverage would
forfeit certain tax benefits, these tax benefits would pale in comparison to
the subsidies on an insurance exchange for low-income employees.
Employees only have the ability to pay for health insurance coverage with
pre-tax dollars if an employer offers them coverage.' 0 2 As a result, individuals
who must purchase their own coverage on the exchange, even if subsidized
with premium tax credits, must pay their share of the premium with after-tax
dollars. For low-income employees, however, it is extremely unlikely that the
ability to pay premiums on a pre-tax basis would outweigh the benefit of the
premium tax credit and cost-sharing subsidies described above. Most lowincome employees have no federal income tax liability,os meaning that the

97.
98.
99.
oo.

See id.
See id.
ACA§ 14 02, 4 2U.S.C.§ 18071 (Supp.V2ol).
This estimate of the out-of-pocket maximum in

2014

was obtained from THE

HENRYJ.

KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PATIENT COST-SHARING UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 2 (2o12),

availableat http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/83o3.pdf.
lol.

SeeACA§I

102.

SeeI.R.C. §§ io6, 125 (2oo6&Supp.V2o1).

103.

In 2oo8, over 30% of all income tax filers faced no federal income tax liability. See Kyle

4

O2,

4

2U.S.C§ 18071.

Mudry, Individual Income Tax Rates and Shares, 2008, STAT. INCOME BULL., Winter 2011, at 22,

24, availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/i iintro8winbul.pdf (finding that only 63.6% of
federal income tax returns filed in 2oo8 were taxable returns).
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tax exclusion for employer-provided coverage would be valuable only for the
payroll tax exemption. As a result, the exemption would be worth 7.65% of
the premium amount.'°4 If the employer were to provide coverage with a
$5000 premium, the tax benefit associated with group coverage would only
be worth $383,05 much less than the estimated premium tax subsidy of
$3394 that an employee could receive in the absence of an employer's offer
of coverage.
Low-income employees would be better off without an offer of
affordable coverage from their employer, even if such coverage were highvalue and fully-subsidized. Assume that a small employer with only lowincome employees offered high-value coverage and paid its full $5ooo peremployee cost. The employees of the firm would pay no tax on the
employer's contribution to health care coverage, satisfy the individual
mandate, and have quality health insurance coverage. Nevertheless, these
employees would be worse off than employees of a competitor firm that did
not offer any health insurance. The competitor firm could pay its workers
wages that were $5ooo higher than the original firm because it would not
have any health care costs. Furthermore, while the workers would pay tax on
the $5000 of additional wages, they would also be eligible for a tax credit of
$3394 based on the previous assumptions. Provided the exchanges offered
coverage options that satisfy employee preferences at prices that are similar
to employer premiums, employees would in almost all circumstances prefer
$5ooo in additional, taxable wages and a $3394 tax credit to lower wages
and employer-provided health insurance.
A second factor that may contribute to employers with low-income
employees choosing to drop coverage is that doing so could potentially allow
their employees to escape the individual mandate. Some low-income
employees would not be subject to the individual mandate at all if they
lacked affordable employer coverage because, even with the tax subsidies,
coverage might be deemed unaffordable.,o 6 These employees would,

Payroll taxes are imposed on all wages. See I.R.C. §§ 3101 (a)-(b), 311 1(a)-(b).
Note that the benefit would be twice as large if one took into account the fact that the
employer also saves its share of payroll taxes.
io6. Premium tax credits under the ACA are based on the maximum percentage of income
an eligible individual is required to pay for the second-lowest-cost silver plan available to her. See
104.
105.

supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. For individuals with income above 250% FPL, the
maximum percentage is 8.05%, rising to 9.5% at 300% FPL and thereafter. HCERA, Pub. L.
No. 111-152, § 1001, 124 Stat. 129, 1031 (2010) (codified as amended at I.R.C. §
3 6B(b)( 3 )(A)(i)

(Supp. V 201 1)) (amending the ACA). The threshold for affordability for
purposes of the individual mandate is 8% of income. I.R.C. § 5oooA(e) (t) (A) (Supp. V 201 1).
As a result, even if a tax-credit-eligible individual selects bronze-level coverage, she may still
avoid the individual mandate if her share of the premium after-tax credits exceeds 8% of her
income. If her employer were to offer her coverage that required a payment of only 7% of
income, she would be subject to the mandate and would either have to elect coverage or pay a
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however, be subject to the mandate if they were offered affordable
employer-sponsored coverage. Thus, by offering coverage, it is possible that
a small employer would cause its employees to be subject to the individual
mandate. An employer offer of affordable coverage could therefore
financially harm an employee who would not have purchased insurance in
the absence of a mandate.
The third basis for our prediction that small employees with low-income
employees will drop coverage is that, starting in 2014, they will feel much
less of a moral obligation to offer group coverage. Small employers often
cite moral obligations to employees as one of the reasons they offer group
coverage.' 0 7 This is understandable: in the current system, an individual who
does not have coverage and becomes sick can suffer dire financial
consequences, not only in the short term through unpaid medical bills, but
also in the long-term because insurers in most states can deny coverage
based on health history and risk.' °s However, both of these factors should
begin to shift in 2014, when the consequences of being uninsured change
significantly. Recall that core provisions in the ACA require insurers to offer
coverage to individuals without any preexisting-condition exclusions or
premium adjustments based on medical condition.o° This means that
anyone who becomes sick and does not have health insurance coverage can
easily acquire it at community-average prices, although that person might
have to wait until the next open-enrollment period.1° Though this does not
entirely eliminate the harm that can result from a lack of coverage, it
significantly limits it, potentially making small employers less likely to offer
coverage than they are under the status quo.
The final explanation for our prediction that small employers with
predominantly low-income employees will choose not to offer coverage in
future years is that the ACA neither requires nor meaningfully rewards such
a decision. As previously noted, small employers are not subject to the
employer mandate and face no penalty associated with failing to offer group
coverage."' Instead, the ACA offers limited-time tax credits to qualifying

monetary penalty. For more detail on the mechanics of the individual mandate, see Amy B.
Monahan, On Subsidies and Mandates:A Regulatory CritiqueofACA, 36J. CORP. L. 78 1 (2011).
107.
See, e.g., FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 3 1, at 7 fig.6 (finding that in 2002, 77% of small

businesses stated that a major factor in their decision to offer health insurance was that "it was
the right thing to do").
1 o8.
See Individual Market Rate Restrictions (Not Applicable to HIPAA Eligible Individuals), THE
HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOuND., http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/individual-market-rate-restrictions/
(last visited May 13, 2013).
log. See supra Part I.
11o.

SeeACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311(c)(6), 124 Stat. 119, 175 (2010) (codified as

amended at 42 U.S.C. 18031(c) (6) (Supp. V 2011)) (requiring the Secretary of HHS to
establish an annual open enrollment period for the individual market exchanges).
11i.

See supra Part 1.
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small businesses that not only offer, but also subsidize, such coverage." 2 To
be eligible for this incentive, an employer must have fewer than twenty-five
full time employees and average wages of less than $5o,ooo."s This credit
has been available since 2010, but its utilization has fallen far short of
expectations.,4 Despite estimates that somewhere between 1.4 million and 4
million employers were eligible for the credit, fewer than 200,000 claimed it
in 201O."5

While small-business tax credits will increase to up to 50% of the
employer's contributions to premiums starting in 2014,'"6 their use by small

employers is not likely to increase and may actually decrease. Recall that the
credit is available for a maximum of two years beginning in 2014.1,7 The
limited duration of the credit makes it unlikely that it alone would
substantially impact employers' decisions about whether to offer group
coverage. This is because establishing a health insurance program for one's
employees inevitably involves a number of fixed costs that are much more
economical if they are spread over a longer period of time.," 8 Additionally, it
may be harder for the employer to drop coverage once it is offered than to
simply not offer coverage in the first place."9
Before concluding, it is important to briefly mention why this analysis
does not necessarily suggest that large employers will also choose to drop
coverage. Without a doubt, some of the analysis described above-such as

112.

ACA§1

113.

Id.

4 21,I.R.C§

4 5 R(Supp.V20II).

114. In 2012, the Government Accountability Office ("GAO") released a report finding
that only 170,300 small employers claimed this credit. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
SMALL EMPLOYER HEALTH TAX CREDIT: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO Low USE AND COMPLEXITY 9

(2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/6oo/5go832.pdf.
115.

Id.

116. See id.
at 6.
117. See supra text accompanying note 82.
1 18.
In order for an employer to establish a health plan, the employer must devote internal
resources to determine the basic structure of the plan, such as eligibility provisions. In addition,
the employer as a practical matter almost always needs to engage either an insurance broker or
an employee benefits consultant in order to structure a self-insured plan or purchase a group
insurance contract. The employer must also obtain legal services if it wants employees to be able
to pay premiums on a pre-tax basis, as the employer must adopt a cafeteria plan in order to
permit such pre-tax payments. The employer must also make adjustments to payroll processing
to account for these pre-tax payments. Finally, the employer needs, with the advice of counsel,
to put compliance systems in place to ensure that all federal and state laws governing group
health plans are complied with. It is the authors' opinion that the significance of these upfront
costs will mean that few employers will establish a group health plan that they intend to have in
place for only two years.
For an overview of the endowment effect, see Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect
119.
and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REv. 1227, 1230-42 (2003). For a critical view of experiments

purporting to establish the endowment effect, see Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The
Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, the "Endowment Effect," Subject Misconceptions, and
ExperimentalProceduresfor Eliciting Valuations:Reply, 1o AM. ECON. REV. 1012 (2011).
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the changing moral dimensions of employers' health insurance plansapplies regardless of employer size. It is also true that low-income employees
of large employers will lose federal tax and cost-sharing subsidies if they are
offered affordable

coverage that provides minimum value.12o The key

difference, however, is that small employers are not subject to the employer
mandate.12, By contrast, large employers are subject to the mandate, and the
amount of the associated penalty for such employers is specifically tied to
the subsidies that their employees receive on an individual insurance
exchange.122 As a result, a larger employer could not simply drop group
coverage and allow its employees to reap the benefits of the premium tax
credits. Doing so would result in an annual penalty of approximately $2000
per employee.2s A large employer is likely to be better off using that amount
of money to subsidize its own health plan or increase employee wages. At the
very least, the cost-benefit calculation is much more difficult for large
employers contemplating completely dropping coverage. For small
employers, however, it seems clear that those with predominantly lowincome employees will find the decision to not offer coverage beginning in
2014 an easy one.

B. SMALL EMPLOYERS WITH PREDOMINANTLY HIGH-INcOME EMPLOYEES
In contrast to the situation described above, small employers with
predominantly high-income employees124 are likely to have substantial
incentives to offer coverage after 2014. This prediction is premised on four
core factors. First, employers will not jeopardize the availability of public
subsidies for their high-income employees by offering coverage because
those employees would not be eligible for any subsidies on individual
insurance exchanges in the first place. For employees with household
incomes above 400% FPL, neither premium nor cost-sharing subsidies will
be available.125 Even for those at the top end of the subsidy range, roughly
between 350% and 400% FPL, the subsidies may not easily outweigh an

offer of employer-provided coverage, given that the subsidy amount declines
120.
See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1401, 124 Stat.
amended at I.R.C. § 3 6B (Supp. V 201 1)).
121.

SeeACA§15I

3

,I.R.C.§

49

119, 213

(2OLO)

(codified as

8oH.

Id.
123.
See id.
124.
It is difficult to determine how many small firms would fall into this category, or any of
the other categories we have identified, because comprehensive data on wages by firm size are
not readily accessible. While the median earnings of full-time workers is near 400% FPL, we do
not know the average wages of small firms or the distribution of wages within such firms. See
122.

BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, REPORT 1038, HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN'S
EARNINGS IN 2011, at 8 tbl.1 (2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom2o1.pdf
(reporting average weekly earnings of $756 in 2o 1, which on an annualized basis is $39,312 or
just under 400% FPL).

125.

SeeACA § 1401, I.R.C. § 3 6B; ACA § 1402,42 U.S.C. § 18071 (Supp. V 2011).
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as an individual's income level approaches 400% FPL. . 6 For example, an
individual earning 399% FPL would be entitled to a premium tax credit of
$546 if we again assume that premiums for silver-level coverage will be
$478o in 2014.'27 And that individual's out-of-pocket maximum would be
reduced by only one-third, with the plan's cost-sharing average moved up to
only 7o%.'12 As a result, for small employers whose employees' incomes are
either greater than or near 400% FPL, their decision to offer group
coverage should not be significantly affected by the ACA's premium or costsharing subsidies.
Second, for small employers with relatively high-income employees, the
value of the tax exclusion for employer-provided coverage is significant.
Assume again that the employer provides coverage with a $5ooo
premium.'29 The full value of that coverage is excluded from an employee's
income for purposes of federal and state income taxes as well as payroll
taxes, resulting in an implicit subsidy of at least $2132 for an employee in
the top income bracket.130 An employer that did not offer coverage of some
sort-even coverage without any employer contribution-would cause highincome employees to forfeit this subsidy. Indeed, the tax subsidy is one of
the primary reasons employer-sponsored coverage is as dominant as it is, and
nothing about this subsidy will change after health care reform is fully
implemented.
Third, in 2014, core provisions of the ACA should make a small
employer's size matter much less in its decision to offer coverage. Currently,
even small employers with predominantly high-income employees may not
offer group coverage because of the high costs that can result from just a
single employee with a serious health condition.sL This should change when
the ACA's guaranteed issue and rating restrictions become effective in
2014.132 These rules will shield small employers from group medical
underwriting, guaranteeing them the option of purchasing group coverage
at nearly community-average prices.'33 At the same time, SHOP exchanges,

SeeACA § 1401,I.R.C. § 36B.
See id. Calculated using the assumption that 399% FPL is $44,568, based on 2012
poverty guidelines.
128. For an overview of HHS's proposed approach to cost-sharing reductions, see THE CTR.
126.
127.

FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvS., ACTUARIAL
VALUE AND COST-SHARING REDUCTIONS BULLETIN I1 tbl. 1 (2012), available at http://cciio.cms.
gov/resources/files/Files2/0224201 2/Av-csr-bulletin.pdf.
129.

This assumption is loosely based on the average cost of employer-provided coverage in

2011. See CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 26, at i (finding that the average cost of employee-only
single coverage in 2011 was $5429).

130.
131.

Calculated by using a combined federal income and payroll tax rate of 42.65%.
Cf CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 26, at 41 exhibit 2.9 (reporting that 55% of small
businesses cited high cost as the most important reason why they did not offer group coverage).
132.
See supra Part I.B.
133.
See supra Part I.
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and perhaps MLR requirements, should help to reduce the administrative
expenses traditionally associated with small-employer coverage. All of this
means that the costs of small-group coverage that may have historically
overwhelmed the tax benefits of such coverage will be substantially reduced.
Finally, high-income employees are much more likely to value the
option of employer-sponsored health insurance than low-income employees.
In part, this is because these employees are more likely than their lowincome counterparts to have assets that they would like to protect from
medical creditors and from potential bankruptcy if their assets are
insufficient to fully pay their medical bills.'34 Additionally, high-income
individuals tend to use their health insurance more than low-income
individuals.'35 One caveat to this analysis, though, is that some high-income
employees may be exempt from the individual mandate if and only if their
employer did not offer group coverage. For this to be true, the individual
would have to face an individual premium on the exchange that exceeded
8% of household income, thereby making coverage unaffordable for
purposes of the mandate, while her employer offered coverage whose
required employee contribution was less than 8% of her income.,36 While
this modestly cuts against the argument made here, it is ultimately of little
consequence given the benefits that group health insurance provides to
high-income employees.
C. MiXED-INCOME SMALL EMPLOYERS
For many of the reasons discussed in the preceding two sections, small
employers with a substantial number of both high- and low-income
employees will face a complicated decision about whether to offer coverage.
Offering coverage will tend to be in the interests of their high-income
employees, but doing so may very well be against the interests of their lowincome employees.
An attractive option for small employers who fit this mold is to offer
coverage to all of their employees, but to structure that coverage so that it
either does not provide "minimum value" (the "minimum-value strategy") or
is not "affordable" for their low-income employees (the "affordability
strategy"). Either strategy would preserve the ability of their low-income
employees to receive subsidies on an individual exchange while allowing
their high-income employees to receive the tax benefits of employer-

134. It is also the case, however, that very high-wealth individuals may have sufficient assets
to self-insure against any medical expenses.
135. See, e.g., Barak D. Richman, InsuranceExpansions:Do They Hurt Those They Are Designed to
Help?, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1345, 1345 (2007).
136. See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1401, 124 Stat. 119, 213 (2010) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 3 6B (Supp. V 201 1)).
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provided coverage.'37 This is because individuals are only eligible for
subsidies on an individual insurance exchange if they do not have the option
of employer-sponsored coverage that is both affordable and provides
s
minimum value. 13

Under the minimum-value strategy, a small employer would structure its
plan to have an actuarial value below 6o%.'s9 This would mean that for an
average population the plan would pay less than 6o% of the cost of covered
services. Such a plan would require significant cost-sharing through
deductibles and co-insurance requirements. 14o At first glance, it appears that
only employers whose high-income employees would find a high cost
sharing plan desirable would likely pursue the minimum-value strategy. It
should be noted, though, that such plans are becoming increasingly
common, reflecting the growth of consumer-driven health care.14'
Moreover, high-deductible plans for high-income employees actually make
good economic sense, because they preserve the benefits of consumerdriven health care (limiting the risk of ex post moral hazard) without the
costs of that approach (shifting excessive risk onto employees).142

Employers that desire to pursue the minimum-value strategy are, in fact,
likely to find the consumer-driven design to be a convenient way to create a
low actuarial value plan that remains attractive to employees. A consumerdriven health plan typically involves a tax-favored savings account, known as
a health savings account ("HSA"), combined with a high-deductible health
plan.143 In employer-sponsored consumer-driven plans, the employer
typically contributes some amount to the employee's HSA, while the
employee can also make additional pre-tax contributions to such
accounts.'44 While there is not yet final guidance on this issue, preliminary
guidance from the IRS suggests that while employer HSA contributions will

be taken into account for purposes of actuarial value, employee
contributions will not.45 As a result, an employer pursuing the minimum-

137.

SeeACA§ 1401(c)(2)(C),I.R.C.§

3 6B(c)(2)(C).

138. See id.
139. As explained later, an employer would need to self-insure to accomplish this. See infra
Part III.B. 2.
140.
See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WHAT THE ACTUARiAL VALUES IN THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT MEAN 4 tbl.2 (201 1), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/

upload/8177.pdf (showing various estimates of 6o% actuarial value plans under the ACA, with
deductibles that range from $2750 to $6350 for single coverage).
141. See CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 26, at 57 exhibit 4.3 (reporting that 23% of firms that
offer group health plans offer a consumer-driven plan).
142. See Regina E. Herzlinger, Let's Put Consumers in Charge of Health Care, HARV. Bus. REv.,
July 2002, at 44, 45-50.
143. See Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society Health Care Policy, 8o TUL.
L. REv. 777, 78o (2oo6).
144. See CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 26, at 131 exhibit 8.7.
145. SeeI.R.S. Notice 2011-73, 2011-40 I.R.B. 474, 474-75.
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value strategy could set up a consumer-driven plan with no employer
contribution to the HSA, thereby lowering actuarial value. Nothing,
however, would prevent the employer from raising employee wages or even
suggesting to employees that they might want to contribute any associated
wage increase to their HSA. This subtle change in the funding of the HSA
may be all that is necessary to turn a plan that provides minimum value into
one that does not.
The minimum-value strategy is likely to be particularly attractive for
small employers with relatively healthy employees because the expected costsharing amounts for these employees would be low. The ability, however, to
manipulate HSA contributions to provide less than minimum value will
likely broaden the appeal of the minimum-value strategy to other small
employers beyond merely those with low expected costs. In the end, no
matter how it is structured, the minimum-value strategy would allow lowincome employees to claim premium tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies,
while still permitting higher-income employees to receive group coverage on
a pre-tax basis. Not insignificantly, the minimum-value strategy would also
enable high-income employees to satisfy the requirements of the individual
6
mandate at low cost.14

The affordability strategy is somewhat simpler to implement than the
minimum-value strategy, and it has the advantage of allowing the employer
to offer a group plan featuring high levels of coverage. Under the
affordability strategy, the employer would first determine the employeeincome level at which it desired to preserve subsidies. It might choose to
preserve the option of subsidies for all employees making less than 400%
FPL, or it might choose a lower threshold given that the subsidies as
employees approach 400% FPL are relatively small. Once that threshold is
chosen, the employer needs only to ensure that employees with incomes
falling below the chosen threshold are required to pay annual premiums
that exceed 9.5% of their income.47 For example, if an employer desired to

146. An individual satisfies the requirements of the individual mandate if she is covered by
"minimum essential coverage." ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 242-44
(2010) (codified as amended § at 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (Supp. V 201 1)). Any employer-provided
coverage is considered "minimum essential coverage." See ACA § 1501(b), I.R.C. §
5oooA(f) (1) (b) (Supp. V 201 1). As a result, a less-expensive, low-actuarial value plan would
give employees the ability to satisfy the mandate at comparatively low cost.
147. Note that while an employer would set contribution rates based on employee income,
eligibility for tax credits is actually determined based on household income, which would include
not only the employee's income, but also the income of any spouse or dependent children. See
ACA § 1401 (a), I.R.C. § 3 6B. As a result, the employer might set the employee-contribution
rate so that it exceeds 9.5% of the chosen income threshold, but not all employees with
incomes under the threshold will necessarily be eligible for premium tax credits, because a
spouse's income may result in household income that is too high. This is not a serious
impediment to the affordability strategy, but rather shows its flexibility. By structuring the plan
so that it will not result in any employees who would otherwise be eligible for premium tax credits
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ensure that all employees with income equal to or less than 300% FPL
would remain eligible for premium tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies, it
would set employee contributions for the group plan at or above $3,184. 148
If the employer wanted to preserve tax credits for all employees at or below
400% FPL, each employee's contribution would need to be at or above
$4,245.

To see how these two strategies might work, it is helpful to work
through a simple example of each. Assume that a small employer, Widget
Company, has twenty employees who are all the same age and non-smokers.
Ten of these employees make 2oo% FPL, and ten have household incomes
of 5oo% FPL. Assume first that Widget decides to sponsor a group health
plan, but not to pursue either the affordability or minimum-value strategies.
In fact, Widget pays the entire premium. As described earlier, if the cost of
coverage is $5ooo per individual, then group coverage will provide the lowincome employees with approximately $383 in tax benefits and the highincome employees with approximately $2132 in tax benefits.49 The federal
subsidy that would result simply from the payment of group coverage with
pre-tax dollars is $25,150.

Now assume that the small employer adopts the affordability strategy.
To do so, it could offer to pay only 5o% of the costs of coverage (or some
lesser amount), requiring its employees to pay the remaining $25oo.5o
Because $2500 is more than 9.5% of the low-income employees' wages
($22,000), these employees would be eligible for subsidies on the exchange
because they would not have the option of "affordable" employer coverage.
They would thus each be able to receive $3394 in health insurance
premium subsidies. The high-income employees would still opt for group
coverage and would still receive a tax benefit of $2132 each. The total
federal subsidy under the affordability strategy would be $55,260: $33,940
in premium tax credits and $21,320 in federal tax subsidies resulting from
pre-tax purchasing. In addition, the employer's costs would decrease by
$25,000, which would be shifted onto employees.'5'

losing their credits, no employee is harmed. Furthermore, the availability of the group plan
ensures that high-income employees continue to enjoy pre-tax purchasing.
148. This figure isjust above 9.5% of 3oo% FPL, which in 2012 was $33,510.
See supra Part II.
149.
15o. Economists have explained that an employer's contribution to health insurance
premiums constitute part of an employee's wages. See Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple
Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 177 , 18o (1989). Therefore, if Widget
decreases its contribution to health insurance premiums by $2500, it should raise employee
wages by an equal amount. Employees can, in turn, pay their required $2500 contribution to
coverage with pre-tax dollars through a cafeteria plan. See I.R.C. § 125(a), (i) (2oo6 & Supp. V
201 1). As a result, while the employer has technically reduced its contribution towards
coverage, an employee is no worse off.
151. In the previous example, Widget had been paying the full premium cost of $5000 for
all twenty employees, for a total cost of $ ioo,ooo. By decreasing its contribution to coverage to
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Under these assumed numbers, a very similar result could be reached if
the employer opted to pay ioo% of the costs of its employees' coverage, but
offered a consumer-driven plan with high deductibles and co-pays that did
not provide "minimum value." Assume, for example, that the employer
offered a plan with a $3ooo annual deductible that required employees to
pay 30% of all costs once the deductible had been satisfied.152 Assume
further that the annual premium for this plan was $3000 per employee. As
under the affordability strategy, low-income employees would likely opt for
coverage on the exchange, because the premium tax credits combined with
richer coverage would likely be more attractive than the employer plan.,53
High-income employees, in contrast, would still likely stay in the group plan
in order to keep the tax advantage unless, of course, they anticipated
consistently high medical expenses.,54 Overall, under this minimum-value
strategy, the federal subsidy would be $46,740: the same $33,940 in
premium tax credits as above and a reduced $12,8oo in tax subsidies
resulting from pre-tax purchasing of group coverage. Overall health
insurance costs would, however, be reduced. While the cost of exchangebased coverage would remain unchanged from the affordability example,
the drop in group premiums would reduce overall health insurance costs by
$20,000.155

To be sure, the tradeoffs of the minimum-value and affordability
strategies would depend substantially on the age and smoking status of the
various employees, an issue that the above example assumes away. First,
these factors could influence the amount of the public subsidies that the
low-income employees would receive on the exchange.156 If low-income
employees also tended to be older, this would increase the benefits of these
approaches because the exchange subsidies are determined based on the
maximum percentage of income an individual is required to pay for silverper employee, half of its employees decline group coverage in order to elect cheaper,
exchange-based coverage. But recall from note 150, that Widget has also raised employee wages
by $2500 per individual. The end result is that Widget is paying $50,000 more in wages, but
$75,000 less in health insurance premiums, saving a total of $25,000.
152. These numbers are loosely based on estimates of a 6o% actuarial value plan. See THE
HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 140, at 4.
153. For some low-income employees who are young and healthy and do not anticipate
incurring any significant medical expenses, the fully subsidized employer plan may in fact be
more attractive than partially subsidized exchange-based coverage. For those individuals who do
not anticipate significant medical expenses, lower premiums are more attractive than richer
benefit coverage.
154. The issue of consistently high medical expenses is discussed in more detail below. See
infra Part III.B. 3 .
155. The drop in overall health insurance costs is attributable to the reduction in overall
group premiums from $50o0 in the affordability example to $3000 in the minimum value
strategy, under the assumption that ten employees will elect group coverage in either scenario.
156. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 Stat. 119, 155 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
3oogg (2oo6 & Supp. V 2ol 1)) (adding § 2701 to the PHSA).
$2500
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level coverage. ,57 If an employee is older, she is still required to pay the same
percentage of income as a younger individual; the premium tax credit
simply increases. By contrast, the subsidies might not be as large if the lowincome employees were younger. Second, these factors could have
distributional consequences among the employer's employees. For instance,
if the low-income employees were young and non-smoking, then highincome employees would be forced to pay more for group coverage because
they would not have young, non-smoking employees in the group pool to
subsidize their costs.
An employer that offered low-income employees "affordable" coverage
with "minimum value," thus ignoring the savings illustrated above, would
disadvantage itself in the labor market. Such an employer would presumably
have to subsidize coverage in order to make it affordable for low-income
employees, whereas an employer pursuing either the affordability or
minimum-value strategy would exploit federal subsidies for the health
insurance coverage of its low-income employees. As a result, an employer
offering affordable group coverage with minimum value would have higher
labor costs than its competitors that shifted low-income employees to
exchanges. This effect could be exacerbated if the employer's subsidy that
assures "affordable" coverage is not actually as generous as the available tax
credit.15s In that case, the employer would presumably have to raise the
wages of low-income employees to make up for any premium tax credit and
cost-sharing subsidies that such employees would lose by virtue of being
offered affordable coverage. If the employer allows the gap between its plan
and the exchange-based plans to persist, it may lose such workers to other
firms that do not offer affordable coverage.59 On the flip side, if the
employer declines to offer a group plan in order to preserve the tax
subsidies for low-income employees, it would need to raise the salaries of
high-income employees in order to account for the lost tax exclusion.
D.

THE IMPACT OF SMALL EMPLOYERS' COVERAGE DECJSIONS

Primarily because of the eligibility provisions for the premium tax
credits and cost-sharing subsidies, along with the fact that small employers
face no penalty for failing to offer coverage, small employers with

157. SeeACA§ 14Os,I.R.C. § 3 6B(b)(3)(C) (Supp.V2Oll).
158. Recall that employer coverage is "unaffordable" when the employee's contribution
exceeds 9.5% of income, whereas an individual earning 2oo% FPL would be eligible for a
premium tax credit that limits the individual's cost for silver-level coverage to 6.3% of income.
See supra Part I.B.2.
159. For an overview of the literature regarding worker sorting based on health insurance
preferences, see Alan C. Monheit &Jessica Primoff Vismes, Health InsuranceEnrollment Decisions:
(Nat'l
Preferences for Coverage, Worker Sorting, and Insurance Take Up 6-io
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12429, 2006), availableat http://www.nber.org/
papers/w1 2429.pdf.

1964

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:1935

predominantly low-income employees will likely drop group coverage. It is
essentially the only rational choice for such employers; doing otherwise
would forfeit thousands of dollars that would otherwise be available from the
federal government. Similarly, small employers with mixed-income
employees are likely to continue to offer group coverage, but to structure
such coverage so that it is either "unaffordable" or does not provide
"minimum value." The end result of these two phenomena is that lowincome individuals will receive coverage on the individual market, rather
than through their employer, and consequently, the small-group market will
be smaller than many have anticipated.
The decreased number of individuals within the small-group market will
complicate the viability of SHOP exchanges and small-group markets more
broadly. Perhaps most importantly, small insurance pools tend to be much
more susceptible to adverse selection than large insurance pools. This is
because the risk composition of the pool can be dramatically impacted by
the exit of some low-cost policyholders., 6o Additionally, reduced take-up by
small employers of group coverage will likely interfere with a SHOP
exchange's ability to take advantage of economies of scale.' 6' The effect may
be significant, as there are various fixed costs to operating an exchange,
such as maintaining a website and producing and disseminating information
6
about available plans.' '
In addition to these effects on SHOP exchanges, the strategies
described in this section could also quite negatively impact the fiscal
implications of the ACA. Small employers' efforts to preserve their
employees' eligibility for individual subsidies on insurance exchangeseither by dropping coverage completely or by pursuing the affordability or
minimum-value strategy-will, of course, increase the federal government's
obligations to provide subsidies. This will increase the costs of providing
such subsidies above current estimates.163 The Part below explores yet
another serious threat to the viability of small-group markets: that small
employers that offer group coverage post-2014 will leave the insured market

in favor of self-insured arrangements.

16o.
161.

See Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 5-6.
See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES AND THE AFFORDABLE

CARE ACT: KEY POLICY ISSUES 9 (201o), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/
media/Files/Publications/Fund%2oReport/2 L/Jul/1426_jost-ht-insurance-exchangesACA.
pdf.
162. Id at1 7 .
163. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION 2 (2012),

available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/
CoverageEstimates.pdf.
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SELF-INSURANCE AND SMALL-GROUP MARKETS PoST-ACA

As made clear in the previous Part, the discrepancies between
regulation of individual and small-group markets, along with tax credit and
cost-sharing eligibility rules, create distinct incentives for small employers to
either drop group coverage or modify it so that it is "unaffordable" or does
not provide "minimum value." Unfortunately, this is hardly the only threat
associated with SHOP exchanges and the small-group market. For reasons
discussed in detail below, the ACA also increases the risk that small
employers that offer any form of group coverage will choose to self-insure
their plans. To the extent that this risk comes to fruition, it could
substantially destabilize the SHOP exchanges by subjecting them to adverse
selection. Given the limited pool of policyholders that we predict will be in
small-group markets in the first place, any further erosion of these markets
caused by self-insurance may create a real risk of market collapse. This Part
explores the likely expansion of self-insurance in small-group markets postACA and examines its potential effect on market viability.
A.

BACKGROUND ON SELF-INSURANCE

A self-insured health plan is one in which the employer retains liability
for claims, rather than transferring that liability to an insurer.164 Historically,
the principal attraction of self-insurance has been that it allows employers to
escape state insurance regulation-particularly mandated benefit lawsunder ERISA's preemption rules.165
Although self-insuring provides regulatory relief, doing so can be costly.
Employers who self-insure generally hire third-party administrators
("TPAs"), who are usually insurers, to operate all non-risk-bearing elements
of the health benefit plan, such as processing claims and paperwork.' 66 They
also often purchase stop-loss insurance, which limits an employer's risk from
unpredictably high claims by transferring it to an insurer.,67 Such stop-loss
insurance can be structured to protect employers either if any individual
employee incurs claims above a specified threshold or if the aggregate
claims of all employees exceed a specified threshold. 68 Either way, these

164. See Korobkin, supra note 14, at 114.
165. See Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market? An Examination of
Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1370 (2007).
166.
CHRISTINE EIBNER ET AL., RAND CORP., EMPLOYER SELF-INSURANCE DECISIONS AND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT As MODIFIED BY THE
HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010 (ACA) 7, it (201 1), available at

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/201 i/RANDTR971 .pdf.
167. Idat o.
168. Id. Assume, for example, that an employer self-insures its health plan but has
purchased a stop-loss policy with an aggregate attachment point of $ioo,ooo. The employer
would be at risk for the first $1oo,ooo of claims under the medical plan, after which the stoploss carrier would reimburse the employer for claims paid under the medical plan.
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thresholds are termed "attachment points" and function much like
deductibles in ordinary insurance policies., 69 In some cases, stop-loss
insurers can apply a different attachment point to a particular employee or
refuse to include that employee's costs in coverage at all, a phenomenon
known as "lasering."17o

Even where a self-insuring employer purchases stop-loss coverage, the
employer still retains some risk of loss. First, the employer retains any risk
below the attachment point of stop-loss coverage.1 7, Second, and much less
appreciated, the employer is liable for medical-plan claims even if the stoploss carrier does not reimburse the employer.17 This might occur if the stoploss insurer becomes insolvent or refuses to pay a claim on the basis that
there was a material misrepresentation in the employer's application or a
policy exclusion applies.
Large employers have been historically much more likely and able to
self-insure than small employers because of their superior ability to bear risk.
Large employers have a big enough employee population to be able to
predict risk relatively accurately, meaning that they are much less dependent
on stop-loss insurance than small employers. In addition, large employers
have greater financial resources to absorb the costs of slightly higher-thanexpected medical losses. Stop-loss coverage is in fact much less common
among the largest self-insuring employees for these reasons.73
By contrast, small employers have rarely chosen to self-insure in the past
precisely because of the increased risk and fixed costs of doing so. In fact, it
is estimated that only 7.9% of firms with three to forty-nine employees that
offered a group health plan were self-insured in 2010. 74 In the rare
instances when small employers have self-insured, they almost always rely on
stop-loss coverage.,75 In the absence of such coverage, a single employee or
employee family member becoming very sick could jeopardize a small
employer's business.
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172. See Am.Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111F. 3 d 358, 364 (4 th Cir. 1997) (explaining that
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BENEFITS TO SMALL EMPLOYERS OF SELF-INSURING IN 2O-4

i.

General Advantages

Even while designing the ACA, policymakers understood that the law
might increase the tendency of small employers to self-insure. Indeed, the
ACA itself contains a provision requiring the Secretary of HHS to study the
extent to which the ACA's insurance-market reforms may encourage small
and midsize employers to self-insure.,76 The reason is that, starting in 2014,
the benefits of self-insuring will increase substantially, particularly for small
employers. In particular, self-insurance will allow small employers to escape
the requirement that (1) offered coverage include essential health benefits,
(2) they participate in risk-adjustment programs, (3) their insurance comply
with medical-loss ratios, (4)all premium increases be reviewed, and (5)
deductibles not exceed $2000 for an individual and $4000 for a family.,77
There are a variety of reasons why small employers may desire to escape
these provisions of the ACA. Two of these reasons have been well-developed
elsewhere, and are therefore only briefly discussed here.,7T First, and most
generically, regulation imposes compliance costs and limits flexibility. Being
able to avoid these requirements by self-insuring could allow an employer to
save money and maintain flexibility in designing its plans. Indeed, very
similar considerations have historically prompted many large employers to
self-insure.
Second, self-insuring would allow small employers with a relatively lowrisk population to avoid cross-subsidizing higher-risk small employers. Such
employers, in essence, need only pay "premiums" that are based on their
own employees' health rather than the health of the entire pool of
individuals in the small-group market.,79 The size of this benefit depends on
the risk level of the employer's workforce: for small employers with very
healthy employees who incur few claims, this benefit could be substantial. 8o
And because self-insured employers are exempt from the ACA's prospective
risk assessment mechanism, such employers will not have to subsidize plans
with higher-risk employees.18'

176. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10103(f), 124 Stat. 119, 895-96 (2010) (amending the
ACA by adding § 1254 "Study of Large Group Market"). Although the section is entitled "Study
of Large Group Market," it contains provisions requiring that the risk of self-insurance in the
small-group market be studied. Id. For the report that was issued in compliance with this
statutory requirement, see EIBNER ET AL., supra note 167, at 4-5.
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SeeJost & Hall, supra note 16, at 8-1 o.
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Self-Insurance as Part of the Affordability or Minimum-Value Strategies

While the above reasons for self-insuring apply to any small employer
that desires to sponsor a group health plan in 2014 and thereafter, selfinsurance is also highly relevant to those small employers with mixed-income
employees that desire to pursue either the affordability or minimum-value
strategy in order to preserve the tax-credit eligibility of their low-income
employees.' 8 2 Employers that want to pursue the minimum-value strategy
must self-insure because the ACA requires all small-group plans to provide a
minimum of 6o% actuarial value, whether they are offered within or outside
of an exchange, thereby automatically satisfying the "minimum value"
standard.'Ss There are, however, no such limitations on self-insured plans.'S4
An employer that self-insured would have numerous options for
designing its plan to avoid providing "minimum value." Although the ACA
mandates that small-group plans cannot use deductibles any larger than
$2000 for an individual or $4000 for a family, a self-insured plan can
employ much larger deductibles-any amount up to the out-of-pocket limits
of $5950 for individual coverage and $11,9oo for family coverage in

2010

dollars.' 85Using large deductibles is a very simple way for a small employer
to keep the minimum value of a plan below 6o%, because in a typical selfinsured population, the vast majority of people will not exceed this
deductible. As previously mentioned, small employers that embrace
consumer-driven health care ideas are particularly likely to pursue this
minimum-value strategy, especially if they happen to have low-risk
employees.
Self-insurance could also be attractive to employers pursuing the
affordability strategy. Recall that this strategy entails an employer sponsoring
a group plan and setting employees' share of premiums at an amount that is
considered unaffordable for all employees with household incomes below a
certain threshold.' 86 The principal benefit of self-insurance to an employer
pursuing the affordability strategy is that self-insurance would enhance its
capacity to inflate premiums to ensure unaffordability for the desired
segment of its workforce.
This is for several reasons. First, self-insured
plans are not subject to the MLR rulesS7 that require a certain percentage of

182.

For descriptions of the minimum-value and affordability strategies, see supra Part II.C.

183.
ACA § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 3oogg-6 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)
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allow them "to enter information about the plan's benefits, coverage of services, and costsharing terms" and would then apply that information to claims data reflecting typical selfinsured employer plans. I.R.S. Notice 2012-31, 2012-20 I.R.B. 906.
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premiums to go towards actual medical expenses. Second, self-insured plans
also escape any scrutiny under the ACA's rate review process. Third, any
excessive premium in a self-insured plan redounds to the benefit of the
employer, rather than a third-party insurer. Admittedly, these benefits may
not be important for employers pursuing the affordability strategy if marketbased group premiums are well above affordability levels for the desired
segment of the workforce. In that case, the employer could simply adjust its
contribution to coverage so that employees' share of premiums equaled or
exceeded desired thresholds. This strategy, however, may be difficult if the
employer wants to ensure unaffordability for employees at the high-end of
the premium-subsidy threshold or feels labor-market pressure to contribute
some amount towards premiums. ,88
3.

A Hidden Benefit of Self-Insurance and the Minimum-Value Strategy:
Dumping High-Risk Employees

While the premium tax credits are likely to drive mixed-income firms to
pursue either the affordability or minimum-value strategy, there is likely an
added benefit to employers of pursuing the minimum-value strategy and
self-insuring. Employers that implemented a low actuarial value plan would
create a perhaps unintended incentive for any employees with high health
risks to decline employer coverage and instead seek coverage through an
individual exchange. Because low actuarial value plans require high levels of
cost-sharing, they will tend to be unattractive to those with significant
medical needs. Employees with reason to know they will incur significant
medical expenses would be better off paying more in premiums in return
for lower cost-sharing of medical expenses. This employee self-sorting could
further increase the benefits of self-insurance for employers: self-insuring
would not only allow the employer to implement the minimum-value
strategy, but it would also make its group plan even more affordable by
decreasing its risk profile. Only a small employer that was self-insured would
enjoy the benefit of this decreased risk profile of its employees. Although
group health plans must satisfy various non-discrimination requirements
related to health status and compensation level, it is unlikely that a plan
design that simply appealed more to high-income or low-risk individuals
would run afoul of current interpretations of these requirements. 189
We have argued elsewhere that large employers are likely to actively
pursue strategies that are specifically designed to dump high-risk employees

188.

It is important to keep in mind that while insured plans can only vary premiums based

on two specific health factors-age and tobacco use-actual health risk is much broader. So an
employer that self-insures enjoys cost savings from all low-risk employees, not just those who are
young non-smokers.
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onto individual exchanges.,9o Small employers may be unlikely to engage in
this type of sophisticated analysis. They are, however, likely to understand
that a low-actuarial cost plan will be unattractive to anyone with significant
medical needs. Additionally, even if this does not enter into employers'
initial decision-making process for their health plans in 2014, those
employers that pursue the minimum-value strategy beginning in 2014 are
likely to see the lowered group health plan costs that result, not just from
offering a low-actuarial value plan, but also from offering a plan in which
predominantly healthy employees choose to enroll. If these results are then
shared within the small-employer community, SHOP exchanges may see
further erosion as more small employers elect to pursue a minimum-value
and self-insurance strategy. At the same time, individual exchanges may
experience increased adverse selection risk as the risk-profiles of their
enrollees become worse.19'
C. REDUCEDRISKS OFSELF-INSURING IN

2014

At the same time that the potential benefits to small employers of selfinsuring will increase in 2014, the downsides of doing so will decrease
significantly. The primary reason for this change is that small employers who
opt to self-insure in 2014 will face dramatically reduced risk from the
prospect of their employees becoming sick. Historically, the risk of selfinsuring has largely been conceptualized as short term: in any given year,
premiums charged might be insufficient to pay the cost of employees'
covered medical expenses.192 But self-insuring has always involved a longterm risk as well: over time, covered medical expenses of employees or their
dependents could systematically increase if just a few people in that
population became quite sick. Stop-loss coverage was no solution to this risk
because such coverage is itself risk-rated.,93 The reason that commentators
rarely focused on this risk was that it was not generally unique to selfinsurance. Outside of a few states that regulated medical underwriting in the
small-group market, small employers often bore this long-term risk even if
they purchased traditional coverage because insurers would adjust their
premiums upward in response to any increased risk of the insured group.94
Starting in 2014, however, the ACA's reforms of small-group markets
will largely eliminate the long-term risk associated with self-insuring. The
o
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See EIBNER ET AL., supra note 167, at 9-1o.

193. See Letter from Eric Smithback, Chairperson, Stop Loss Work Grp., Am. Acad. of
Actuaries, to Office of Health Plan Standards and Compliance Assistance, U.S. Dep't of Labor
12 (June 29, 2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/StopLossoo88.pdf ("For
individual stop loss, carriers use both manual rating and experience rating to determine the
coverage and premiums for a given employer.").
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ACA requires insurers in the small-group and individual markets to price
their policies without taking into account any health-related information
other than age and tobacco use.,95 Consequently, a self-insured small
employer that perceived the cost of self-insuring to be increasing due to the
deteriorating health of its workforce could simply abandon the decision to
self-insure and purchase coverage at community-average rates on the smallgroup market. Historically, this option was not available because the
coverage acquired on the small-group market would reflect the health-risk
level of the small group.9 6 However, by eliminating such medical
underwriting in the small-group market, the ACA indirectly also eliminated
the long-term risk that has historically accompanied self-insuring.
To be sure, not all of the risk of a self-insurance strategy would dissipate
as a result of this change.,97 First, small employers who self-insured would
still face the short-term risk that their employees would incur larger than
expected medical costs before the employer could switch to conventional
small-group coverage. This risk, however, can be reduced, but not
eliminated, through the purchase of stop-loss insurance. Second, selfinsuring small employers would face new strategic risks from uncertainties
surrounding the anticipated costs and benefits of a self-insurance program
because the magnitude of the benefits and the costs of self-insuring are hard
to predict.98 Third, if the stop-loss carrier either denies claims or becomes
insolvent during the contract period, the employer will generally be liable to
pay medical-plan claims.,99 Fourth, there is also some liquidity risk associated
with self-insuring, as coverage may not be payable until the end of the year
while costs are incurred throughout the year.20 0 Finally, there would be some
legal and regulatory risk from electing to self-insure: rules governing stop-

195.
ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 12 4 Stat. 119, 154 (2010) (codified at 4 2 U.S.C. §
3oogg (2oo6 & Supp. V 201 1)) (amending § 2701 of the PHSA).
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SeeHall, supranote 4, at 716-17.
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INST.,

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES: FACTORS AFFECTING
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VIEWS FROM THE MARKET (2013), available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/
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198. On the cost side, the future expense of purchasing stop-loss insurance, paying a TPA,
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loss insurance could always change, as could the various regulatory
exemptions associated with self-insuring.
Although a small business's decision to self-insure starting in 2014
would thus continue to entail some risk, this risk would be relatively
manageable for most small employers that offered any form of group
coverage post-2014. This is because the small employers that are likely to be
interested in offering any form of group coverage in 2014 and thereafter are
those that have a non-trivial percentage of high-income employees.o1 These
small employers are the most likely to be willing to take on some risk from
self-insuring if the expected benefits of doing so outweigh the expected
costs. The reason, in a nutshell, is that firms with higher aggregate labor
costs can absorb more easily the type of loss that might be associated with
higher than anticipated employee health costs and the burden of shifting to
an insured plan.
To see why, consider a stylized example. Suppose that self-insuring is
expected to generate a cost savings of $2o,ooo relative to offering an insured
plan. Also assume, however, that this is a risky proposition, such that there is
a 20% chance that self-insuring will produce a loss of $5o,ooo and an 8o%
chance that it will produce a benefit of $37,5oo. An employer with twenty
employees who each make $25,ooo a year is likely to be concerned about
this strategy because it includes a 20% chance of a io% increase in labor
costs. By contrast, a small employer with twenty employees who each make
$ioo,ooo a year would face only a 2o% chance of a 2% increase in labor
costs, which is a much more tolerable downside.
A final, and more speculative, reason that self-insurance may become
less costly to small employers in 2014 is that firms, for the first time, will be
actively competing to develop affordable self-insurance products in the
small-group market.2 2 Anticipating the potential benefits to some small
employers of self-insuring in 2014, various firms have been working to
develop more cost-effective ways to facilitate small firm self-insurance.
Although it is hard to predict the degree to which this new-found
competition will be able to reduce the costs of self-insurance, it seems likely
that it will do so to some degree.

D. THE IMPACT OF SMALL EMPLOYERS'DECISIONS TO SELF-INSURE
The primary risk of substantial self-insurance in the small-group market
is that it may trigger adverse selection in SHOP exchanges. Adverse selection
occurs whenever an insurance pool disproportionately contains high-risk
individuals. Recall that self-insurance is particularly likely to be attractive to
low-isk small employers who can thereby take advantage of their better-
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than-average risk profile. This means that those small employers who do opt
for exchange coverage rather than self-insurance will tend to be
comparatively high risk. This problem is made even worse by the fact that
small employers who initially choose to self-insure, but then observe
heightened expenses among their employees, can easily opt back into the
SHOP exchange. And, of course, the migration of companies could also
work in the opposite direction, so that firms obtaining group coverage
through a SHOP exchange could opt to self-insure if they find their
employees incurring much lower expenditures than the firm is paying in
premiums.
Several economic models have attempted to predict the impact that
increased self-insurance among small employers may have on premiums in
the small-group market. The official study for the Department of Labor
estimated that if low-risk stop-loss coverage becomes widely available,
increased self-insurance among small employers would result in relatively
modest adverse selection in the small-group market, causing a premium
increase of 3.3% for platinum-level coverage.20 3 A study by the Urban

Institute estimated significantly larger impacts of self-insurance on the smallgroup market, calculating that premiums will be up to 24.8% higher in the
small-group market if low-risk stop-loss coverage is widely available.204 The
primary difference between the models used in the two studies is the
assumed level of attachment point in the stop-loss policies.205 The official
Department of Labor study modeled an attachment point of $2o,ooo at the
lowest,206 whereas the Urban Institute study modeled results if stop-loss

coverage was available with an attachment point as low as $o.207
Concerns regarding the effects of increased rates of self-insurance on
small group markets are therefore well-established. But there may be
additional risks to self-insurance that are not reflected in these studies. First,
the extant literature fails to take into account the desirability of selfinsurance to small employers with mixed-income employees who want to
pursue either the minimum-value or affordability strategies. As described
above, employers interested in these strategies are either required or likely
to self-insure. This means that the prospect of self-insurance among small
employers may be more likely than existing analyses suggest.
Second, there may also be a heightened risk of adverse selection in
SHOP exchanges because the employees who do purchase coverage in

203.

EIBNER ET AL., supra note 167, at 63.

204.

MATrHEW BUETTGENS & LINDA

J.

BLUMBERG, THE URBAN INST., SMALL FIRM SELF-

INSURANCE UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACr 12 exhibit 8 (2012), available at http://www.
commonwealthfund.org/-/ media/Files/Pubications/ Issue% 2 oBrief/ 2012/Nov/ i 647-Buettg
enssmall firm self insurance-underACAjib.pdf.
205.

See id. at

206.

EIBNER ET AL., supra note 167, at 57-58.

207.

See BUETTGENS &BLUMBERG, supra note 205, at 1o.

5

.

IOWA LAWREVIEW

1974

[Vol. 98:1a935

exchanges will tend to be disproportionately high-income. This may
interfere with the ability of carriers to use increased cost-sharing to limit the
expenditures of high-risk policyholders. High cost-sharing requirements are
less likely to restrain the spending of high-risk, high-income individuals than
the costs of high-risk, low-income individuals.2o8 As a result, to the extent
that a SHOP exchange experiences adverse selection, it will have limited
tools at its disposal to reign in the spending of enrollees.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the risk of adverse selection on
SHOP exchanges is enhanced by the fact that enrollment in these exchanges
will tend to be relatively small for reasons independent of self-insurance. As
described in Part II, small employers with predominantly low-income
employees will have strong incentives not to offer group coverage at all,
notwithstanding modest tax credits designed to encourage such coverage.
This increases the risk of adverse selection from self-insurance, as small
pools of policyholders are at increased risk of adverse selection because an
influx of high-risk individuals will more dramatically impact overall perperson expected costs.209
Even apart from adverse selection risk, small employers' move toward
self-insured plans may increase the risk of employment discrimination
against high-risk individuals.- ° Recall that a single high-risk individual can
dramatically increase costs for small groups. Stop-loss carriers typically
medically underwrite such coverage, meaning that they review the health
profiles of the individuals whose medical risks are being reinsured.-1 Stoploss carriers also often apply higher individual attachment points for
212
employees expected to incur higher than average medical expenses. Stoploss carriers are also able to "laser" certain individuals and exclude them
entirely from coverage under the policy.213 To be clear, these practices do
not directly impact the individual; they only impact the employer's ability to
obtain stop-loss coverage for that individual's losses. But it is easy to imagine
that an employer may be unenthusiastic about hiring an individual whose
expenses a stop-loss carrier will not cover under its policy. A firm that fired
an individual on such a basis would generally, but not always, be engaging in
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reality,

though,

policing
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against such

discrimination is extremely difficult.521
IV. SAVING SMALL-GROUP MARKETS

Given the multiple reasons to be worried about the health of smallgroup markets outlined in Parts II and III, this Part presents various
potential strategies for preserving the viability of SHOP exchanges. The
existing literature on small-group markets post-ACA has focused on
regulating stop-loss coverage.2, 6 While regulating stop-loss coverage can help
limit the risk of self-insurance, a much broader range of tools are available
to counteract damaging strategic behavior by small employers and ensure
that the SHOP exchanges will be competitive against the option of selfinsurance. Unlike the regulation of stop-loss insurance, these tools can also
help limit the risk that small employers will drop coverage entirely.
A.

REGULATE SToP-Loss COVERAGE

To date, the primary proposed policy response to the self-insurance risk
has been enhanced regulation of stop-loss coverage. Professors Mark Hall
and TimothyJost have been particularly active, and persuasive, in advancing
this approach.217

Although states cannot directly regulate self-insured

employers under ERISA, stop-loss insurance is subject to state insurance
regulation.2,s

By making

stop-loss

insurance

less

available

to

small

employers, states could decrease the attractiveness of self-insurance for these
employers. This is because stop-loss insurance is a practical necessity for
small businesses considering self-insuring, as described above. 219 Proposed
state regulatory approaches range from banning stop-loss coverage for small
employers, to regulating minimum attachment points, to prohibiting stoploss insurers from risk-rating their premiums on the basis of group risk.220
Banning stop-loss insurance for small employers entirely or prohibiting
risk-rating by stop-loss insurers are both unlikely to gain political traction in
most states. Simply banning stop-loss insurance for small employers directly
would discriminate against small employers. While three politically liberal
states-New York, Delaware, and Oregon-do indeed do this, these rules
were passed prior to the ACA and thus in a much less politically contentious

214. See Roberts, supra note 211 (noting that discrimination by employers on the basis of
smoking and obesity may not violate federal law as it is currently interpreted).
215.
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environment because most small employers did not care to self-insure or
purchase stop-loss coverage.-' Similar logic applies to attempts to prohibit
stop-loss insurers from risk-rating, an approach that New Jersey
implemented prior to passage of the ACA.222 This strategy would likely have
the same effect as an outright prohibition on stop-loss insurance for small
businesses because it would subject stop-loss insurers to a substantial risk of
adverse selection.
A more politically viable option is to increase legally mandated stop-loss
attachment points. Many states already have laws that limit attachment
points,23 and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
("NAIC") has a model law on this topic. 24 Almost all of these laws require

minimum attachment points that have not been increased in well over a
decade, thus failing to keep up with inflation.225 There is also an intuitive
appeal to the notion that a small employer is not really self-insuring if it is
passing off almost all of the risk of its employees' health care expenses to a
third-party stop-loss carrier. Despite all of these factors, proposals to increase
attachment points have gained little traction at the NAIC.22 6 Furthermore, a
recent proposal in California to require attachment points to be set at 125%
of expected losses has faced sharp resistance from a number of groups.2 2 7
Although raising minimum attachment points for stop-loss insurance is
a potentially politically viable option, it is also an incomplete solution.
Raising minimum attachment points for stop-loss insurance would make self-

SeeHall, supranote 2o, at318.
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PM), http://www.siia.org/i4a/pages/index.cfmpagelD=62oo; Bill Analysis: Hearing on SB 1431
Before the S. Assemb. Comm. on Health lo- 1 (Ca. 2012), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/i - 12/
bill/sen/sb_ 4 01-1 4 5 0/sb _ 143 icfa_2012o630150017_asm_comm.html.
221.
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insuring a riskier, and thus less attractive, proposition for small employers.
But it would still allow small employers to pass off much of their risk to stoploss insurers. At the same time, it would do nothing to change the fact that
small employers who are low risk relative to other small employers with
similar employee age and smoking profiles would have a positive expected
benefit from self-insuring. Raising minimum attachment points will not,
therefore, tend to deter risk-neutral or only moderately risk-averse small
businesses from self-insuring,.
Additionally, raising minimum attachment points for stop-loss
insurance is not without risks. First, to the extent that doing so failed to
deter small businesses from self-insuring, it would merely force small
businesses to bear risks that they would prefer to offload. This could harm
small businesses without producing any beneficial improvement in health
insurance markets. Second, raising attachment points could cause some
employers simply to drop coverage entirely rather than turn to SHOP
exchanges. Third, and finally, raising minimum attachment points could
have the perverse effect of increasing the tendency of small employers who
originally chose to self-insure to migrate back onto the SHOP exchange at
the first sign that their workforce is incurring larger than community-level
health expenses. Whereas a self-insured employer with robust stop-loss
insurance might be willing to continue self-insuring after a single year of
larger than expected costs, less stop-loss insurance makes this a more
dangerous proposition. Perversely, this could actually increase the risk of
adverse selection on SHOP exchanges.
Despite these concerns, raising the minimum attachment points for
stop-loss insurance to some level at or above expected costs is a sensible
proposal. At the same time, however, such a change would have a limited
impact in addressing the many challenges described above. Moreover, even
this moderate reform of stop-loss insurance will prove politically infeasible in
many state legislatures. For these reasons, the remainder of this Part
explores alternatives that could either act as a complement to stop-loss
reform, if enacted, or could help protect the small-group market if such
reform is not viable.
B.

DESIGNING SHOPS TO COMPETEAGAINST SELF-INSURANCE

The existing literature has tended to focus on counteracting the selfinsurance risk by making the option of self-insurance less appealing to small
employers. States, however, must also focus on the flip side of the coin:
making SHOP exchanges more attractive, particularly relative to the option
of self-insuring. Doing so would have the benefit of not just counteracting
the self-insurance risk, but also counteracting the risk that small businesses
will choose to drop coverage entirely because they face no penalty for failing
to offer group coverage.
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To be sure, SHOP exchanges face important limitations in their
capacity to compete against the self-insurance option. Most importantly,
SHOP exchanges cannot offer discounts to certain low-risk small employers,
while self-insurance allows low-risk small employers to enjoy the benefits of
their low-risk status.228 This limitation, however, is less damaging than it may
first appear because plans within SHOP exchanges can offer roughly
actuarially appropriate discounts to groups on the basis of their age and
smoking status.22 9 Thus, the mere fact that a small business has relatively
young employees who tend not to smoke should not put SHOP exchanges at
a competitive disadvantage to self-insurance.
Moreover, even with this sizable handicap, we believe that SHOP
exchanges can compete effectively against self-insurance if they are properly
designed and marketed to small businesses. For this to occur, however,
SHOP exchanges must exploit the weaknesses of the self-insurance option,
just as brokers and stop-loss insurers will undoubtedly attempt to exploit the
weaknesses of SHOP exchanges. Fortunately, self-insurance has plenty of
downsides, many of which are capable of overwhelming the advantages of
self-insurance even for small employers with risk profiles that are moderately
below what would be expected for small businesses with employees of a
similar age and smoking status. In particular, self-insurance is complex,
risky, and limits employee choice. By contrast, SHOP coverage can be made
simple, risk-free, and choice-enhancing. As explained below, offering and
fully supporting a defined-contribution model for health insurance may
enhance a SHOP exchange's capacity to offer these benefits as a contrast to
self-insurance. Crucially, this response to the self-insurance risk does not
require any legislative or even regulatory action. There is, however, an
important element of timing to these measures. While the actions described
below will help make SHOP-based coverage more attractive, and therefore
provide a counter-pressure against self-insurance, they will ultimately be
effective only if adverse selection does not overwhelm premiums. SHOP
exchanges therefore need to carefully consider implementing these
strategies as the exchanges become operational. Any significant delay may
result in self-insurance gaining the upper hand.23 ° Furthermore, if
premiums in the SHOP exchanges become significantly higher than firms
can obtain through self-insured arrangements with reasonable stop-loss
protection, these actions are much less likely to save small-group markets.

228.
229.

See supraPart III.
See supraPart 1.

230. Unfortunately, HHS recently announced that it was delaying until 2015 roll out of
employee choice for small businesses in the 33 federally run insurance exchanges. It is also
delaying the requirement that state-run exchanges offer an employee-choice option until that

time. See Robert Pear, Small Firms' Offer of Plan Choices Under HealthLaw Delayed, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr.
1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2oi3/o4/o2/us/politics/option-for-small-business-health-

plan-delayed.html?_r=o.
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Leverage Employee Choice

Small employers typically cannot offer their employees a choice of
health plans. Rather, when a small employer offers group coverage, whether
that coverage is insured or self-insured, there is typically only a single option
available.RsP This is likely because there are certain fixed costs associated with
supporting more than a single health insurance option, making it
impractical for small employers to offer multiple plans. By contrast, large
employers can, and often do, offer employees a small menu of options from
either a single or multiple carriers.2s2
The ACA, however, gives SHOP exchanges the unique ability to provide
small employers with an easy way to allow their employees to choose from
multiple plans. Under the ACA, small employers can designate multiple
options within the SHOP exchange from which their employees can elect
coverage.,3 An employer could, for example, give its employees the option
of electing coverage under any plan offered in the exchange within certain
metal tiers or just from among individually-specified plans.234 Under this
approach, the employer would presumably make a defined contribution
towards coverage, requiring the employee to bear the additional costs of
more expensive policies.-s5 The employer's contribution to such a plan
would not constitute taxable income and, crucially, the ACA specifies that
employees' contributions to these plans can also be paid with pre-tax
dollars.236 By contrast, the ACA is clear that employee contributions towards
the purchase of coverage on the individual market must be with after-tax
dollars.237
Employee choice is a unique competitive advantage that the SHOP
exchanges can offer over both traditional group insurance and selfinsurance, and the exchanges should leverage it to their advantage. Such
choice allows employees to select a plan among numerous alternatives that

supranote 26, at 55.
Id.
233.
See Exchange Establishment Standards and Other Related Standards Under the
Affordable Care Act, 45 C.F.R. pt. 155 (2012); Health Insurance Issuer Standards Under the
Affordable Care Act, Including Standards Related to Exchanges, 45 C.F.R. pt. 156 (2012);
Employer Interactions with Exchanges and Shop Participation, 45 C.F.R. pt. 157 (2012).
234. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1312(a)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 182 (2010) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 18o32(a) (2) (Supp. V 2011)).
235.
The term "defined contribution health plan" has been used to refer to many different
types of health plans and arrangements. See PAUL FRONSTIN, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST.,
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES AND DEFINED CONTRIBUTION HEALTH PLANS: Is IT DtIA
Vu ALL OVER AGAIN? 3 (2012), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRIIB-o 7 201 2No37 3 -Exchg2.pdf.
236. ACA, § 1515, I.R.C. § 125 (2oo6 & Supp. V 2011). Beginning in 2014, if a state elects
to allow large groups to participate in the exchange, those large employers would also have the
ability to use a cafeteria plan to pay for exchange-based coverage. Id.
231.

CLAXTON ETAL.,

232.

237.

See id.
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covers their particular providers and contains their preferred mix of
premiums, out-of-pocket cost-sharing requirements, and covered services. At
the same time, it places downward pressure on premiums by ensuring that
individuals are fully aware of the financial effects of their choices.38s
Providing employees with a wide variety of health-plan choices will likely give
small employers a competitive advantage over those that offer only a single
option. In addition, providing such choice relieves small employers of the
weight of responsibility that is inherent in selecting only a single option for
employee health care, particularly if employees have negative experiences
with the single plan selected.
2.

Leverage Limited Risk

Self-insurance will be a risky proposition for small employers,
particularly in states that raise minimum attachment points for stop-loss
insurance. Even with low attachment points, there are various risks
associated with self-insuring, as described in Part III, including stop-loss
carrier insolvency or claim denial, changing costs and benefits of selfinsurance, and liquidity risk for the small employer.
Purchasing coverage in a SHOP exchange, by contrast, can be pitched
to small employers as an entirely risk-free strategy. Any form of coverage
purchased through a SHOP exchange will present no risk to employers that
their employees will experience larger-than-average health care expenses
either because of natural fluctuations in health care expenses or because the
small employer's pool of employees is less healthy than expected. It also
relieves small businesses from bearing the risk of insurer insolvency or nonpayment, both of which are technically borne by employees, but also
substantially borne by providers in the case of traditional small-group
coverage.
SHOP exchanges could further cultivate this competitive advantage by
supporting defined-contribution arrangements that promote employee
choice, as described above. A defined-contribution model goes even further
than traditional small-group coverage in eliminating risk for employers
sponsoring insurance coverage because it allows them to easily choose the
extent to which they will bear future premium-cost increases.2s9 For
example, if an employer chose to make a $3000 contribution to each
employee's health insurance choice, it could elect to keep that contribution
level year after year, thereby forcing employees to bear any increased
premiums. Alternatively, it could choose to increase contributions based on
wage inflation or inflation in health insurance costs. Although employers
sponsoring traditional group plans also have control over the amount of
future premium increases they will bear, a defined-contribution model is

238.

SeeFRONSTIN, supra note 235, at 3.

239.

See supra text accompanying noteS 236-38; infra text accompanying note 240.
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more consistent with placing this risk on employees because it allows them
to select a lower-cost plan in response to premium increases.
3.

Leverage Simplicity

Perhaps the biggest competitive advantage that SHOP exchanges enjoy
over self-insurance is their potential to make small-group coverage simple.
Self-insurance is extremely complicated. It requires small employers to
design a benefits package, select a stop-loss carrier, and meet an attachment
point.4 ° Applying for stop-loss requires medical underwriting of employees
and may result in the lasering of specific employees.24, Finally, self-insuring
requires small employers to constantly reevaluate the calculation of whether
to remain self-insured or switch to SHOP coverage based on factors
including SHOP premiums, stop-loss premiums, lasering, insolvency and
claim-payment risk, employee preferences, and potential legal and
regulatory risks. Many small employers are likely to find these distractions
highly unappealing and desire an option that allows them to focus on their
core business.
By contrast, properly-designed SHOP exchanges can make the process
of shopping for and maintaining group coverage extremely simple for small
employers. SHOP exchanges, of course, are specifically meant to make
selecting an appropriate small-group plan simple by presenting information
about different plans in an organized format and centralized location.4 But
SHOP exchanges can, and should, do much more than this.
Historically, the small-group market has been burdened not only with
higher overhead costs imposed by insurers, but also with the regulatory
burden that comes along with sponsoring a group health plan.243 Employer-

sponsored health plans are subject to extensive federal regulation from
reporting and disclosure obligations to fiduciary-duty requirements.244 Even
the presumably simple task of allowing employees to pay their share of
health insurance premiums on a pre-tax basis requires a fair amount of legal
know-how. Employers must establish a written cafeteria-plan document and
administer the plan in accordance with fairly complex rules regarding when
and to what extent an employee can change her health plan election during
a plan year.2 45

SHOP exchanges could greatly enhance their value to small
employers-and further distinguish themselves from the self-insurance

240.

See supra Part III.

241.

See supra Part III.

See Terry Gardiner, Health Insurance Exchanges of Past and Present Offer Examples of
Featuresthat Could Attract Small-Business Customers, 31 HEALTH AFF. 284, 286 (2012).
243. See id.
244.
Seegenerally29U.S.C.§§ 1001-1191 (2oo6&Supp. V2o11).
242.

245.

SeeI.R.C.§ 125 (2oo6&Supp.V2011).
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option-by making these legal-compliance tasks as simple as possible.
Essentially, SHOP exchanges could function as would the in-house benefits
department at a large firm. The SHOP exchange could provide the
employer with the required disclosures under ERISA, such as the summary
plan description and any summaries of material modification. It could also
provide employers with "off the shelf' cafeteria-plan documents that allow
for the pre-tax payment of health insurance premiums. Importantly,
exchange staff could also be trained to process mid-year "change of status"
requests in accordance with IRS regulations, relieving small employers of
this burden. SHOP exchanges could even consider providing COBRA
administration for employers.246 All of these services could be provided, for
free, to exchange-participating employers, and they would be yet another
tool to help counteract the attractiveness of self-insurance.
SHOP exchanges could potentially further enhance their simplicity
relative to self-insurance by fully supporting defined-contribution
arrangements. Choosing an appropriate plan is a complicated endeavor for
a small business, even if the available options are clearly explained. Unlike
individuals, small businesses must expend a substantial amount of effort in
discerning and updating their own preferences (i.e., the preferences of their
employees as a group). A defined-contribution model eliminates this
complexity by relieving the employer of the need to select a plan, instead
allowing individual employees to make this decision on their own. Indeed, a
defined-contribution model could limit small employers to making a single
decision: how much they want to contribute to their employees' coverage.47
Eventually, the simplicity of this decision could enable small businesses to
jettison their insurance brokers, thus reducing the administrative costs to
small employers of acquiring coverage.
4. A Cautionary Note on Defined-Contribution Arrangements
While defined-contribution arrangements provide a unique competitive
advantage for SHOP exchanges over self-insurance, they may result in
adverse selection within an exchange if low-risk employees self-segregate
into lower-cost plans. The ACA attempts to limit this risk by suggesting that
employers may make available to their employees only plans within a specific

246. COBRA administration refers to administering the continuation of group health plan
coverage where an employee would otherwise lose such coverage following one or more
qualifying events. COBRA coverage gets its name from the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act that created such rights, and it is subject to complex legal rules regarding
notification of rights, election of coverage, and termination of coverage. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1 1611 169.
247.
There are, however, reasons why employers might want to be more involved in the
decision. Employers may, for example, only want to give their employees choices within certain
metal tiers.
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precious-metal category.4 8 Other options may also help mitigate the risk,
such as risk-adjustment mechanisms within an exchange. Nonetheless,
adverse selection is a substantial risk associated with a defined-contribution
model. Given the numerous incentives that small employers have to not play
ball in the first place, however, SHOP exchanges must take on this risk for
themselves and manage it as best they can.
C.

BROKER INCENTIVES AND SELLING SHOPs OVER SELF-INSURANCE

Unfortunately, simply designing SHOPs to compete effectively against
self-insurance is not sufficient. Coverage through SHOP exchanges must
also be actively marketed and sold to small businesses as a superior
alternative to self-insuring. Currently, at least half of all small employers
secure their health insurance coverage through insurance brokers, who help
them navigate the complexities of selecting appropriate coverage.2 49
Brokers, however, are likely to have strong incentives to steer their
small-employer clients to self-insurance over coverage through a SHOP
exchange. Under the MLR rules, broker commissions paid in the smallgroup market are treated as non-medical expenses.2 50 As a result, they must
be included in the maximum 20% of premiums that can be spent on nonmedical expenses-a fact that already has limited the commissions that
brokers earn by selling small-group contracts.2 ' The same limitations do not
apply to stop-loss coverage, which is not subject to MLR restrictions.2 52 Rules
governing "navigators," who help small employers use SHOP exchanges,
may further depress the commissions that brokers can make by selling
traditional coverage to small employers.255 On the other hand, commissions
for selling stop-loss insurance tend to be quite high, as medical-loss ratios for

248.

ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1312(a)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 182 (2010) (codified at 42

U.S.C. § 18032(a)(2) (Supp.V 2011)).
249.
See LESLIE JACKSON CONWELL, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, ISSUE BRIEF
NO. 57, THE ROLE OF HEALTH INSURANCE BROKERS: PROVIDING SMALL EMPLOYERS WITH A
HELPING HAND 1 (2002), availableat http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/ 4 8o/ 4 8o.pdf.

25 o . Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) Requirements
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,864, 74,877 (Dec. i,
2010) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 158.16o (2012)) [hereinafter MLR Rules].
251.
See MICHAELJ. MCCUE & MARK A. HALL, INSURERS' RESPONSES TO REGULATION OF MEDICAL
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Files/
Loss RATIOS
(2012),
Publications/Issue%2oBrief/2012/Dec/16 3 4 _McCueinsurers_responsesMLRregulaion_ib.pdf.
SeeMLR Rules, supranote 250.
252.
253. In particular, navigators need not be insurance brokers and are not allowed to receive
different amounts of compensation for directing individuals to different carriers. See HEALTH
INS. & MANAGED CARE (B) COMM., NAIC, MARKETING AND CONSUMER INFORMATION WHITE
PAPER:

NAVIGATORS,

AGENTS AND BROKERS,

MARKETING

AND SUMMARY OF BENEFITS AND

COVERAGE 4 (2o12). Together, these two factors may result in further decreased compensation
for insurance brokers who facilitate the purchase of coverage on a SHOP exchange, as
compared to the commissions that they can receive from selling self-insurance related products.
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such coverage can be as low as 6o% in some states2 54 Given all these factors,
commissions for stop-loss coverage are likely to be higher than those
available for selling exchange-based coverage.
While there are potentially good market reasons to be unenthusiastic
about self-insurance relative to SHOP coverage, financially motivated
brokers may steer small employees to self-insurance in order to maximize
their commissions. They may downplay the complexities, risks, and
limitations associated with self-insurance, while emphasizing the potential
problems with SHOP coverage. For small employers who have limited
knowledge and interest in health insurance markets and a trusting
relationship with their broker, this steering could prove extremely effective.
At least two options are potentially available to SHOPs looking to
combat the prospect that brokers will steer small employers to self-insured
plans. One promising possibility is for SHOP exchanges to employ a force of
SHOP-exclusive brokers that would market only SHOP-based products to
small businesses. These in-house brokers could aggressively pitch the
advantages of an insured product over a self-insured product. They could
explain the complications that may come with self-insurance while
emphasizing the advantages of SHOP coverage. Finally, these agents could
emphasize that brokers who offer contrary advice may be motivated by
commissions rather than by employers' best interests.
A more aggressive, but quite sensible, option for overcoming broker
incentives to push self-insurance is to directly regulate the commissions that
stop-loss insurers pay. States could legislatively require that insurance
brokers receive the same commissions for selling stop-loss coverage that they
receive for selling traditional group coverage. Alternatively, they could adopt
MLR rules for stop-loss coverage that mimic the ACA requirements for the
small-group market. Less aggressively, states could pass strong commissiondisclosure rules that require brokers to clearly disclose the fact that they
have financial incentives to sell stop-loss coverage as an alternative to
traditional group coverage.255 To be sure, many of these approaches are
likely to encounter serious political opposition given that brokers are a wellorganized lobby and that there is no obvious source of counter-pressure in
the political process. At the same time, though, the market problems that
differential compensation for insurance brokers create are well understood
and were at the root of a massive scandal in the property/casualty insurance
6
industry less than a decade ago.25

254. See Letter from Sandy Praeger to Kathleen Sebelius & Hilda Solis, supranote 223.
255. Se Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency
in Insurance Consumer Protection (Feb. 18, 2013) (forthcoming in UCLA Law Review, 201 3 ).
256. Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The Casefor Banning Contingent Commissions, 25 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 289, 290-91 (2007).
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ADDITIONAL REGULATORY/LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS FOR STATES

Limit Churning Between SHOP Exchanges and Self-Insurance

Recall that one substantial attraction of self-insurance post-ACA is that
small employers can always switch to SHOP-exchange coverage at
community-average rates.2 57 This protects small employers against the
prospect that any of their employees will become high-risk in the future,
thus triggering increased stop-loss insurance coverage costs. Migration in the
opposite direction is also possible: small employers can shift into the selfinsurance market from the SHOP exchange if their employees experience
comparatively low health care costs. Both types of churning increase the risk
of adverse selection on SHOP exchanges by facilitating employers' capacity
to self-insure when they are low risk and switch to traditional group coverage
if, and when, they become high risk. Limiting the capacity of small
employers to switch between SHOP coverage and self-insurance could
simultaneously make self-insurance a less attractive option and limit the
prospect of self-insured employers causing adverse selection by opting back
into the insured market. There are various ways this might be accomplished.
First, SHOP exchanges could implement an open-enrollment period for
small employers that have previously been self-insured. Currently, federal
regulations require SHOP exchanges to maintain rolling enrollment,
meaning that small businesses can purchase coverage at any time
throughout the year.58 These rules, however, did not specifically
contemplate the problems associated with extending rolling enrollment to
previously self-insured employers. As such, HHS could clarify that these rules
do not preclude SHOP exchanges from limiting rolling enrollment for
previously self-insured employers. If the open-enrollment period for
previously self-insured small employers were sufficiently long-perhaps once
every other year-then small employers who opted to self-insure would face
substantial barriers to switching back into the insured market once their
group became high-risk. There is some precedent for this approach: in the
past, Colorado has proposed a three-year waiting period for small businesses
that first elect coverage in an individual market and then desire to switch
back into a more heavily regulated small-group market in order to take
advantage of rating restrictions applicable to that market.259

257.

See supra Part III.

258.

See supra note 233 and accompanying text.

259.

MARK A. HALL & ELLIOT WICKS, AN EVALUATION OF COLORADO'S SMALL-GROUP

HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM LAWS 41 (1999), available at http://www.phs.wfubmc.edu/public/

pubinsurance/PDF/colorado.pdf ("[The] amendment allows a self-employed individual to
choose whether to purchase individual or group coverage. But if someone opts for individual
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To be sure, this approach would not be perfectly effective. First, stoploss insurers might try to combat this limitation by designing their policies'
renewals to correspond with open enrollment on the exchange. However,
this would require stop-loss carriers to issue policies for two-year periods,
placing on them, and thus indirectly on their policyholders, a much greater
risk that low-risk small groups would become high-risk. Second, self-insured
small employers who became high-risk could elect simply to drop group
coverage altogether, as individuals can enroll at any time on an individual
6
exchange if they have had a change of status in their employer coverage.2 o
This option, however, would penalize any high-income employees by leaving
them unable to pay for coverage on a pre-tax basis. In summary, while
limiting enrollment into SHOPs would not solve the churning problem, it
could mitigate the problem substantially by making the decision to selfinsure more complicated and risky.
A second option to reduce churning is to impose a state-level fee or tax
on previously self-insured employers that seek coverage on the SHOP
exchange. Employers would then need to factor this potential cost into their
initial decision to self-insure, which should decrease the attractiveness of
self-insuring. The primary barrier to this approach is that it could be
interpreted as incorporating previous insurance status into the effectiverating factors, which would violate the provisions in the ACA limiting rating
factors to a small number of variables.2 61 However, given that the fee would
be a one-time expense and would be paid to the state rather than the
carrier, it seems likely that it could be framed as a tax rather than as a
premium-rating factor.
Finally, SHOP exchanges may also want to address migration out of the
exchange in addition to countering migration into the exchange. One
approach for accomplishing this might be for the exchange to require
employers to make a multi-year commitment to offer some form of group
coverage on the exchange, if the employer offers any group coverage at all.
This would not commit an employer to offering group coverage, nor would
it constrain the employer's choice of carrier or plan, but it would prevent an
employer from easily moving to self-insured coverage when its employees
experience low claims costs. Unfortunately, this requirement could
conceivably cause low-risk employers to eschew SHOP coverage in the first
6
place. As such, its advisability is unclear.2 2

260. CfACA, Pub. L. No. 11-148,§ 1311(c)(6), a24Stat. 119,175 (2010) (codified at 4 2
U.S.C. § 18031 (c) (6) (Supp. V 201 1)).
261. See ACA § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 3oogg (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (adding § 2701 to the
PHSA).
262. Other "softer" alternatives may be both more palatable and more successful. For
example, the exchange could offer a fee waiver for those employers that are willing to make a
multi-year commitment to purchase coverage through SHOP to the extent that they chose to
offer any type of group plan.
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Merge the Individual and Small-Group Markets

The ACA explicitly gives states the option of merging their individual
and small-group markets.2 63 Essentially, the effect of merging the markets is
to ensure that premiums are priced based on the risk profile of the
combined market.264 As a result, merging the markets may, in some states,
alleviate the risk of adverse selection from self-insurance by increasing the
size of the risk pool in the insured market. The effects of such a merger
would, however, be felt in both the individual and small-group markets and
could affect premiums in both markets.

6

5 Consequently, states would need

to carefully model such a merger in order to determine the premium and
coverage effects in both the individual and small-group markets before
proceeding. Merging the two markets will not automatically maximize
coverage while lowering premiums. It is likely to be most successful in states
where the individual market is expected to be substantially larger than the
small-group market. Where that is true, introducing a small number of highrisk individuals from the small-group market is unlikely to have a significant
effect on premiums in the combined market. Given the potential upside of a
merger, every state should give this option serious consideration, particularly
if the state permits low attachment point stop-loss coverage for small
employers.
3.

Expand the Small-Group Market to lo Full-Time Employees in 20l4

In 2 016, the ACA provides that the small-group market will consist of all
firms with loo or fewer full-time employees. 66 For 2014 and 2015, states
have the choice of defining the small-group market as firms with either fifty
or fewer or loo or fewer full-time employees. 67 Opting for the ioo or fewer
full-time employee standard beginning in 2014 will expand the size of the
small-group market in the state. As discussed above with respect to merging
the individual and small-group markets, this could potentially reduce the
effects of adverse selection. While each state would need to model the
expected results of a definitional change in 2014, this too is worth serious
consideration.

263. SeeACA§ 1312(C)(3),42 U.S.C. 18032(c)(3) (Supp. V2011).
264. See generally Jon Kingsdale, How Small-Business Health Exchanges Can Offer Value to Their
Future Customers-And Why They Must, 31 HEALTH AFF. 275 (2012).
265. In Massachusetts, for example, where the individual market was quite small, merging
the individual and small-group markets brought down premiums in the individual market. See
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A NOTE ABOUT FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE OPTIoNs

It is of course true that there are many possible ways that federal
legislation could be used to protect small-group markets. Just to name a few,
Congress could directly regulate stop-loss insurance, it could choose to
regulate self-insured plans on the same basis as insured plans, or it could
change either the small-business tax credit or the premium tax credit to
encourage more small businesses to offer group coverage. Given current
political realities, however, this Article has focused on actions that states or
federal regulators could take independently to remedy the likely weaknesses
of the small-group market. It is most likely that states or federal regulators
operating federally facilitated exchanges will be in the best position to
effectively address challenges to small-group markets.
CONCLUSION

There are very good reasons to be worried about the viability of smallgroup markets when the ACA's reforms are widely implemented in 2014.
The lack of a penalty associated with dropping group coverage, along with
substantial individual tax credits that are available only if an employer does
not offer "affordable" coverage that provides "minimum value," are likely to
lead to many small firms exiting the group market. In addition, the
increasing availability of stop-loss insurance will make self-insuring easier for
small employers that desire to offer group coverage but do not want to face
the new regulatory burdens the ACA imposes. If small-group markets are not
only to survive, but prosper, SHOP exchanges must take on these threats to
group coverage directly. While there are many legislative solutions available at
the federal level to protect these markets, this Article has illustrated that there
are also state legislative options and administrative remedies that states and
federal regulators can undertake in order to help save small-group insurance
markets.

